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Identifying the Role of Social Norms in
Mediation: A Multiple Model Approach
by
ELLEN A. WALDMAN*
Reports from the field suggest that the "quiet revolution" in dis-
pute settlement continues.' The steady growth of mediation2 supplies
persuasive evidence. Once primarily limited to labor-management ne-
gotiations3 and neighborhood disputes, 4 mediation has spread to a
wide variety of settings. Rather than suffer the delays and expense of
adversary proceedings, couples pursuing divorce,5 environmental
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earlier drafts, and to Mary Beth Herald for her patience in listening to errant thoughts on
the topic during long jogs.
1. See LINDA R. SINGER, SETTrNG DISPUTES: CoNFLIcr RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS,
FAMILIES, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 1 (1990).
2. Mediation has been described as "the facilitation of an agreement between two or
more disputing parties by an agreed-upon third party." CATHIE J. WrrTY, MEDIATION
AND SocErY: CONFLICr MANAGEMENT IN LEBANON 4 (1980). Vague and capacious, this
definition encompasses a potpourri of procedures. This descriptive vagueness is a virtue if
the definition's purpose is to allow for and encourage a heterogeneous mediation practice.
This vagueness becomes a definitional vice, however, when attempting to distinguish be-
tween models and to clarify how traditional mediation differs from sibling processes. This
Article offers additional terminology in an effort to facilitate a more precise understanding
of what mediation entails.
3. See generally JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLIcTs WrrHouT LMGATION 4 (1984); WILLIAM E. SIMKIN &
NICHOLAS A. FmANDIS, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
(2d ed. 1986); Jay Folberg, A Mediation Overview: History and Dimensions of Practice, 1
MEDIATION Q. 3, 5 (1983).
4. See JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: TiE ROLE
OF LAWYERS 297 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing development of Neighborhood Justice Centers
and the community mediation movement).
5. In 1991, mediators conducted an estimated 65,500 court-connected child custody
mediations in California alone. See CALIFORNIA STATEWIDE OFFICE OF FAMILY COURT
SERVICES, A SURVEY OF CALIFORNIA FAMILY COURTS: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION (ADR) AND AUXILIARY SERVICES 1 (1994).
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agencies seeking compliance with governmental regulations,6 commu-
nities embroiled in public policy debates,7 employers facing discrimi-
nation charges,8  law enforcement agencies handling certain
misdemeanors, 9 and other civil disputants,10 have turned increasingly
in recent years toward a "mediated solution." But, at the risk of bela-
boring the seemingly obvious, what exactly is a "mediated solution?"
Mediation's expansion into various fields has worked a subtle, yet
pervasive change in some mediators' methodology.'" Interventions
that challenge the central premises and goals of traditional mediation
have become part of mainstream practice. This evolution has gener-
ated some discomfort.' 2 For the most part, however, observers have
6. See generally LAWRENCE SussKID & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IM-
PASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 165-72 (1987); Law-
rence E. Susskind, NIDR's State Office of Mediation Experiment, 2 NEGOTIAION J. 323,
324 (1986) (describing Massachusetts Mediation Service's mediation of hazardous waste
disposal disputes).
7. See Lawrence Susskind, Mediating Public Disputes, 1 NEGOTIATION J. 19, 21
(1985) (describing state sponsored mediation to settle disputes surrounding the siting of
hazardous waste facilities).
8. EEOC: Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy, 8 FAIR EmL. PRAC. MAN. (BNA)
§ 405:7301 (Feb. 1997) (discussing EEOC policy supporting use of ADR in civil rights
cases).
9. For example, the office of the City Attorney in San Diego, California, employs a
Dispute Resolution Officer to mediate between defendants and victims of minor criminal
offenses such as vandalism, harassment, petty theft, and battery. Interview with Jerry
Parker, Dispute Resolution Officer of the San Diego City Attorney's Office, in San Diego,
Cal. (June 11, 1996).
10. In Los Angeles County, California, the numbers of disputes handled by private
mediators or other alternative dispute resolution providers increased at an average rate of
15% per year between 1988 and 1993. This increase occurred at a time when the number
of cases filed in the Los Angeles County courts decreased by .5%. ELIZABETH ROLPH ET
AL., ESCAPING THE COURTHOUSE: PRIVATE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN LOS
ANGELES 18-19 (Rand 1994). In Dallas, estimates suggest that one quarter of the non-
family cases on the state district court dockets will be resolved through mediation. See
Charles B. Camp, Legal Remedy: More Dallas Cases Are Being Resolved With Mediation,
THE DALLAS MORNING NE vs, Oct. 26, 1993, at 1A, 10A. Between 1985 and 1988, the
percentage of claimants willing to use alternative dispute resolution to handle claims
against Traveler's Insurance Company increased from 50% to 76%. See OFFICE OF RE-
SEARCH, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, GUIDE TO EARLY DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MAKING
ADR WORK FOR You 1-3 (1993) [hereinafter MAKING ADR WORK FOR You]; Peter S.
Chantilis, Mediation U.S.A., 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (1996) (noting that approxi-
mately half of all states have implemented some form of court-ordered mediation).
11. See infra notes 82-221 and accompanying text.
12. See Leonard L. Riskin, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LrnG. 111, 111 (1994)
("Almost every conversation about 'mediation' suffers from ambiguity. People have dispa-
rate visions of what mediation is or should be."); Thomas R. McCoy, The Sophisticated
Consumer's Guide to Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques: What You Should Expect
(or Demand) From ADR Services, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 975, 976-83 (1996) (noting that
mediation, like several other ADR techniques, has acquired a confusing, and in some in-
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viewed the internal tensions within the field as signs of salutary fer-
ment, and as the necessary growing pains of an inexhaustibly flexible
and protean dispute resolution process.13
Some mediation scholars have endeavored to order and classify
these new approaches. They contrast the therapeutic approaches of
some mediators with the bargain and exchange tactics of others.' 4
They compare problem-solving mediators who labor to "expand the
pie," with adversarial mediators concerned only with distributing the
pieces.' 5 They distinguish those mediators who narrowly define the
issues under discussion from those who expand the circumference of
negotiations.' 6
These analyses, while enormously helpful, leave unclear whether
the differences in mediator orientation reflect distinct practice models,
or simply stylistic variations on a unified theme. 7 More importantly,
stances misleading, set of labels); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Book Review, 45 J. LEGAL
ED. 149, 153 (1995) (reviewing KmBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDATION: PRINcIPnLES AND
PRACticE (1994)) ("The proliferation of mediation programs and empirical studies of
mediators' behavior belies any monolithic vision of mediation practice and raises impor-
tant definitional and policy questions.").
13. Kimberlee Kovach observes that mediator practice often departs from the "tradi-
tional" or "purist" model, but concludes that "the ability to adapt and modify the media-
tion process is a primary benefit of its use." KOVACH, supra note 12, at 27.
14. See Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW &
PoL'Y Rnv. 7, 19-22 (1986) (identifying two types of settlement strategies among
mediators: bargaining and therapeutic. The bargaining mediator looks for bottom lines,
narrows issues, and sidesteps intractable conflicts of interest. The therapeutic mediator
emphasizes emotions, expands the discussion, and explores past issues not raised by the
immediate situation, complaint, or charge.).
15. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 794-801 (1984) (discussing competi-
tive versus problem-solving negotiation styles).
16. See Leonard L. Riskin, 7ivo Concepts of Mediation in the FmHA's Farmer-Lender
Mediation Program, 45 ADMN. L. Rnv. 21, 44-54 (1993) [hereinafter Riskin, Two Con-
cepts] (delineating the "broad" and "narrow" mediative approaches employed by different
mediators in federally sponsored farmer-lender mediation). In a more recent work, Pro-
fessor Riskin adds a second axis to his mediation taxonomy. Building on the earlier obser-
vation that mediators differ in the breadth or narrowness with which they define the
problems to be addressed, Riskin notes that mediator strategies range along a facilitative/
evaluative continuum as well. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations,
Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARv. NEGOTIATION L. Rnv. 7
(1996) [hereinafter Riskin, A Grid for the Perplexed].
17. Indeed, these analyses tend to attribute divergence in mediation method and tech-
nique to differences in mediator temperament and profession of origin. See Emily M.
Brown, Divorce Mediation in a Mental Health Setting, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY
AND PRACrIcE 127, 139 (Jay Folberg & Ann Milne eds., 1988) (noting that the methods of
therapist-mediators differ from those of attorney-mediators, a difference that "derives
from a basic difference in approach and orientation to the resolution of personal
problems"). See also FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 134 (discussing various ap-
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they classify mediator behavior according to criteria which ignore, or
treat obliquely, the role social norms play in the process.18
proaches to mediation, including labor mediation, therapeutic mediation, and lawyer medi-
ation, and observing that "[t]he approach used to mediate a dispute depends on the nature
of the conflict... [the] resources of the disputants and the background and training of the
mediator"). But see Silbey & Merry, supra note 14, at 19 (noting that many mediators
utilized both bargaining and therapeutic modalities, often in the same case).
Some mediation theorists suggest that the proliferation of varied mediation ap-
proaches indicates the growing number of practitioners who are simply "doing it wrong."
Se4 e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CoNFLicr THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AD RECOGNITION 28-53 (1994)
(describing settlement-oriented mediators who derail the transformative potential of medi-
ation by focusing on settlement rather than the moral growth of the participants). See also
Linda Stamato, Easier Said Than Done: Resolving Ethical Dilemmas in Policy and Prac-
tice, 1994 J. Disp. RESOL. 81, 86 (suggesting that mediators functioning properly "do
not. .. 'value' cases" and that enhanced mediator training might eliminate such errant
practices). Very few existing analyses, however, suggest that the observed variety in medi-
ation practice reveals the existence of separate, yet equally valid, mediation models. But
see Riskin, A Grid for the Perplexed, supra note 16 (identifying four mediation "orienta-
tions," describing the distinct techniques and strategies employed in each, and embracing
all four as credible forms of mediation). See Andrew I. Schwebel et al., Divorce Mediation:
Four Models and Their Assumptions About Change in Parties' Positions, 11 MEDIATION Q.
211,213-214 (1994) (identifying four different divorce mediation models that rely on differ-
ent strategies to help parties reach agreement. Schwebel labels the models legal, labor
management, therapeutic, and communication and information.).
18. Certain classifications implicitly look to the mediator's treatment of social norms
as a way of distinguishing mediator modalities. See, e.g., McCoy, supra note 12, at 981
(distinguishing "aggressive mediation," where the mediator helps parties evaluate their re-
spective claims according to prevailing legal norms, from interest-based mediation where
no such evaluation occurs); Riskin, A Grid for the Perplexed, supra note 16, at 23-24 (con-
trasting facilitative mediation, in which the mediator eschews reference to norms extrinsic
to those the parties identify and consider important, and evaluative mediation, in which the
mediator "assumes that the participants want and need her [the mediator] to provide some
guidance as to the appropriate grounds for settlement based on law, industry practice or
technology"). However, those classification systems that differentiate mediator styles
based, in part, on the mediator's use (or disuse) of social norms, treat mediator reference
to social norms as an instrumental strategy used to effect settlement. Under this view,
mediators discuss judicial reasoning and make predictions to eliminate unreasonable and
extreme demands, narrow the scope of the contested terrain, and lessen the parties' negoti-
ating burdens. See Riskin, A Grid for the Perplexed, supra note 16, at 44 ("The evaluative
mediator, by providing assessments, predictions, or direction, removes some of the deci-
sion-making burden from the parties and their lawyers. In some cases, this makes it easier
for the parties to reach an agreement."). See, e.g., Lenard Marlow, The Rule of Law in
Divorce Mediation, 9 MEDIATION Q. 5, 11 (1985). This vision of evaluative or norm-based
mediation devalues the content of social norms. It emphasizes the utilitarian, rather than
deontological purposes served when a mediator references social norms in a dispute. The
typology set forth in this Article reverses the focus. While recognizing that discussion of
social norms may help a case settle, it assumes that inclusion of social norms in mediation
agreements may in fact yield "better" agreements. It further assumes that many mediators
who discuss social norms in their mediations are motivated by the same assumption.
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Although the mediation literature is rich with "thick descrip-
tions"19 of various mediator styles, it lacks a theoretical framework
that takes adequate account of the disparate role social norms play in
different mediation models. This conceptual gap hinders our efforts to
construct meaningful professional standards, and impedes both practi-
tioner and client understanding of what mediation entails. Height-
ened attention to the role of social norms in mediation is necessary to
allow mediators to adequately explain their methodologies and to al-
low clients to supply informed consent to mediator interventions.
This Article proposes a refinement of mediation theory in an ef-
fort to clarify discussion and comprehension of the field. It seeks to
separate out the variety of processes grouped together as mediation
and distinguish them based on their divergent treatment of social
norms. It suggests that what passes as mediation today constitutes not
one, but three separate models.20 It terms these models "norm-gener-
ating," "norm-educating," and "norm-advocating" respectively. These
interventions are similar in that they all employ mediative techniques.
19. "Thick description" was originally defined as ethnography that observes and inter-
prets human culture as a system of signs and symbols. See generally Clifford Geertz, Thick
Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE INmRPRETATION OF CuL-
TURES: SELECrED ESSAYS 3-30 (1973). More generally, it has come to denote description
which transcends the mechanical rendering of events and situates human action in a rich
temporal, spatial, and cultural context. See also Bette-Jane Crigger, Negotiating the Moral
Order: Paradoxes of Ethics Consultation, 5 KENNEDY INST. ETmics J. 89 (1995) (offering a
"thick" description of ethics consultation and its larger effects on public moral discourse).
For a particularly "thick" and illuminating description of mediation practice, see WHEN
TALK WoRKs: PROFiLES OF MEDIATORS (Deborah M. Kolb & Assocs. eds., 1994).
20. Although the models are distinct, reflecting separate approaches to social and
legal norms and pursuing slightly different goals, they are not mutually exclusive. A medi-
ator may use each of these models in different cases, or, indeed, when handling different
issues in the same case.
Professors Silbey and Merry described mediators as inclining toward either a "bar-
gaining" or "therapeutic" approach, but clarified that these modalities should be under-
stood as conceptual constructs, not quantitative descriptions of what mediators do. See
Silbey & Merry, supra note 14, at 7-8, 19. In contradistinction, Professor Riskin intends his
system, which distinguishes between narrow and broad problem identification and facilita-
tive or evaluative strategies, to describe the practices of actual mediators (while acknowl-
edging some mediators cross over and draw from different models). See Riskin, A Grid for
the Perplexed, supra note 16, at 26 n.60. I believe that the models herein described do in
fact accurately depict the practice of some mediators and mediation programs. However,
for many other mediators, these models represent idealized forms from which they draw
selectively in particular cases. A divorce mediator, for example, may select one model at
one phase, and a second model at a different phase in the same case. See infra notes 100,
212 and accompanying text.
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However, they differ in their relationship to existing social and legal
norms.
21
The model characterized as "norm-generating" corresponds to
traditional notions of mediation, in which disputants are encouraged
to generate the norms that will guide the resolution to their dispute.
In this model, disputants negotiate without recourse to existing social
norms. The models characterized as "norm-educating" and "norm-
advocating" constitute more recently evolved paradigms, in which so-
cietal norms occupy a significant role in the disputants' negotiations.
This Article contends that drawing a conceptual distinction be-
tween these related but separate processes is necessary if mediation
theory is to keep pace with actual practice. Although existing classifi-
cations fruitfully illuminate certain issues, answers to other increas-
ingly pressing questions remain obscure. As the mediation field
moves to assume the insignias of an established profession, it faces a
number of challenges. How is mediator education and training to be
organized and evaluated? Is licensure or certification necessary to
21. At various points in this Article I refer to legal and social norms interchangeably.
By this usage, I do not mean to suggest that they are equivalent. When I speak of social
norms, I mean to include those principles and standards that have attained consensus sta-
tus in society. Legal norms consist of principles and standards encoded in the law. Of
course, many social norms are instantiated in legal codes. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, Jus-
TIcE WImoUr LAW 11 (1983). These social norms may also be termed legal norms. How-
ever, some social norms are not enshrined in the rule of law. This may be because they are
implicated in few disputes, are sufficiently politically sensitive to ensure legislative avoid-
ance, or have only recently begun to command widespread support. In another paper, I
have suggested that received wisdom about child development as well as universally
respected bioethical principles may be characterized as social norms, but not as legal
norms, because they have not yet been adopted in binding legal texts. Ellen A. Waldman,
The Challenge of Certification: How to Ensure Mediator Competence While Preserving Di-
versity, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 723, 726 n.23 (1996).
Although mediators may make mention of both legal and social norms in their ses-
sions with parties, the role of legal norms in mediation has received much more attention.
See James H. Stark, Preliminary Reflections on the Establishment of a Mediation Clinic, 2
CLNICAL L. REv. 457, 486 (1996) ("the question of whether a mediator should provide
such [legal] information and evaluation is vigorously contested"). But see Nancy J. Foster
& Joan B. Kelly, Divorce Mediation: Who Should Be Certified?, 30 U.S.F. L. Rnv. 665,675
(1996) (implicitly suggesting that social norms have a place in divorce mediation and that
divorce mediators be trained in child development as it relates to the construction of
parenting plans). The point, for purposes of this Article, is that whether the mediator
discusses social or legal norms, the same controversies obtain.
22. This model is the archetype that many mediators, especially those trained to work
in Neighborhood Justice or community mediation centers, assume occupies (or should oc-
cupy) the entire mediation field. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 17; see also Trina Grillo,
Respecting the Struggle: Following the Parties' Lead, 13 MEDIATION Q. 279, 279 (1996)
(noting that transformative mediation, which is norm-generating in its inattention to social
norms, is "the very essence of good mediation").
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protect the consumer? If so, how are such programs to be estab-
lished? What core set of ethical principles should guide mediator
behavior?
The existing theoretical framework cannot do the work required
to adequately confront these questions. Adherence to an all-encom-
passing definition of mediation creates confusion within the mediation
literature, performance standards, and ethical codes. The tripartite
model this Article proposes will help dispel this confusion and will
allow for the creation of more useful professional guidelines.
Part One describes the traditional "norm-generating" model,
drawing on a dispute scenario ("the neighborhood spat") well-known
to mediation trainers and students alike. Additionally, this Part offers
a brief outline of the types of disputes in which the norm-generating
model is most commonly and advantageously used. In describing the
stages and techniques associated with this model, I will be treading
ground familiar to anyone with passing knowledge of conflict resolu-
tion theory. I review this information, however, for an idiosyncratic
purpose: to pinpoint those process stages and mediative techniques
common to each of the three models, and to set the stage for a discus-
sion of each model's differences.
Part TWo traces the development of the "norm-educating" and
"norm-advocating" models. It then provides an example of the norm-
educating model drawn from one mediator's account of a typical di-
vorce mediation, and sketches the dispute qualities which render ap-
plication of the norm-educating model appropriate.
Part Three sets out the norm-advocating model, using a case
study from a mediation project located in one of New York's busiest
hospitals. It demonstrates that mediators employing the norm-educat-
ing and norm-advocating models utilize mediative techniques, but
modify those techniques to include legal and social norms in the pro-
cess. Part Three further suggests that norm-advocating mediation
may be valuable in disputes which require the application of social
norms, but are susceptible to a variety of satisfactory resolutions
within the limits set by those norms.
Part Four addresses why recognition of the tripartite scheme is
important. The blurred contours of our current mediation theory ob-
struct efforts both to define mediator competence, and to devise a
consistent set of ethical standards. A survey of scholarly works and
statutory schemes seeking to quantify and regulate mediator compe-
tence reveals an utter lack of consensus regarding what it is mediators
April 1997]
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should be expected to know and do.23 Similarly, the ethical guidelines
formulated by professional organizations inconsistently adjure
mediators both to respect disputant autonomy and to override dispu-
tant agreements that contravene societal norms of fairness and
equity.24
Conceptualizing mediation as a process comprising three separate
models allows for a resolution of these tensions. It reveals that sub-
stantive knowledge of the social norms related to the disputed issues is
irrelevant in a mediation process that follows the norm-generating
model, but very important in both the norm-educating and norm-ad-
vocating models. It highlights the primacy of disputant autonomy in
the norm-generating model and exposes the values that may trump a
disputant's autonomous choice in the norm-advocating model. In
sum, recognition of the tripartite scheme clarifies that a mediator's
required knowledge base and ethical compass may vary depending
upon the mediation model used. It allows for much needed revision
and clarification of existing qualification standards and ethical codes,
and paves the way for further consideration of the types of disputes in
which each of the three mediation models may be most profitably
employed.
I. Traditional Mediation: A Norm-Generating Process Using
Mediative Techniques
A. Description of the Norm-Generating Model
What follows is a classic example of norm-generating mediation.
While the details of implementation may vary,2s the process described
below displays the model's general features.
Ed and Fran are neighbors. Ed is twenty years old and works the
five-to-ten shift as a chef at the local diner.26 Ed purchased his
home seven months ago and is enjoying living away from his family
23. See infra notes 213-265 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 268-283 and accompanying text.
25. For example, some mediators conduct most of the mediation in separate meetings
with each party. The ground rules may differ from mediator to mediator. In states that
have enacted statutes protecting the confidentiality of mediation proceedings, the mediator
informs the parties of these protections, rather than securing an additional contractual
agreement. See Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transition from Theory to Imple-
mentation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the
Process and the Public Interest 1995 J. Disp. REsOL. 1, 2 n.6 (listing profusion of state
statutes establishing a mediation privilege).
26. This scenario derives from a mock mediation exercise in NANCY H. ROGERS &
RICHARD A. SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE LAWi: TEACHER'S
GUIDE 33-38 (1987).
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for the first time. Celebrating his freedom, he routinely has boister-
ous weekend parties that extend until midnight or one in the
morning.
Fran has lived in her house fifty of the seventy-one years of her life.
She has always enjoyed the neighborhood, until recently, when Ed
moved next door. Now, she is kept awake by the sound of Ed's
motorcycle cruising in at ten-thirty on week nights, and by the loud
music coming from his parties on weekends.
Fran telephoned Ed during one weekend party to complain about
the noise, and the music dimmed temporarily. After a brief inter-
lude, however, the volume began to climb to its former level, and
Fran called the police. After that, when the noise became intolera-
ble during parties, Fran did not contact Ed. She simply called the
police directly. Fran also suspects that Ed revs his motorcycle when
he comes home simply to irritate her.
After one particularly raucous weekend, Fran saw Ed walking down
the street with some companions. Fearing another party in the
making, Fran called out, "Change your disgraceful ways." The com-
panions turned out to be Ed's parents. In retaliation, Ed bought
some red paint and painted "I love sex" in big letters on Fran's
door. When Fran opened the door, she saw the message and saw
Ed running with a paint can. She immediately called the police and
said she wanted Ed prosecuted for defacing her property. The pros-
ecutor said that her office could not prosecute the case immediately
and suggested that Fran attempt mediation first. Doubtfully, Fran
agreed.
The mediator, Mr. M., conducted the entire mediation with both
Fran and Ed present together. He began by explaining the media-
tion process and his role as a third party neutral. He then secured
their agreement to follow certain ground rules. Specifically, Ed and
Fran agreed to eschew abusive language, to keep interruptions to a
minimum, and to direct their comments throughout the mediation
either to their fellow disputants or to the mediator, according to Mr.
M.'s instructions. Mr. M. also secured Fran and Ed's agreement to
be bound by certain confidentiality rules. Specifically, each agreed
to forbear from using statements or documents generated during
mediation in any future civil proceeding.27
Next, Mr. M. asked Fran to explain to him, from her perspective,
what had led to the mediation and what she would like to see ac-
27. Some mediators may broadly request that the parties promise to treat as confiden-
tial all statements made in mediation. Others may explain the relevant statutory provi-
sions, and the situations in which information pertaining to the mediation must be
disclosed by law. Others will require the parties to privately agree to more stringent pri-
vacy provisions than is required by statute. The exact treatment of confidentiality varies
depending upon the applicable jurisdiction's statutory and common law, and the media-
tor's personal view of what the parties should be told about the issue. See Erin L. Kuester,
Comment, Confidentiality in Mediation: A Trail of Broken Promises, 16 HAMLrNE J. PuB.
L. & POL'Y 573, 573 (1995) (arguing that mediation clients are often given the misleading
impression that everything said in mediation is confidential, when, in fact, the protections
conferred by law are much more limited).
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complished during the session. Fran told Mr. M. about the
problems with the motorcycle noise, the parties, and the graffiti on
her door. She also told him of her affection for the neighborhood,
her prior sense of safety and repose, her current discomfort, and her
desire that Ed move out. Mr. M. reflected back28 to Fran his sense
that Fran was deeply frustrated and felt that her peace and quiet
had been disturbed.
Mr. M. then asked Ed to relate his view of the issues and describe
what, for Ed, would constitute a good outcome. Ed told Mr. M. that
he felt entitled to enjoy his hard-purchased freedom and privacy.
Ed also expressed to Mr. M. concern that Fran complained directly
to the police without confronting Ed first; he vented his distress
over Fran's ill-timed remark in front of his parents; and he ex-
pressed no remorse over the door, calling it "deserved payback."
He concluded that, in his view, Fran's departure from the neighbor-
hood would constitute a "good outcome." Mr. M. reflected back
Ed's irritation over Fran's frequent calls to the police and Ed's em-
barrassment about being insulted in front of his parents.
After both parties had had an opportunity to tell their stories to
him, Mr. M. presented a short summary of what he believed the
issues to be and asked the parties to verify that the issues he had
identified were indeed those the parties wished to address. Mr. M.'s
list of issues was as follows: 1) motorcycle noise; 2) late night party
noise; 3) lack of communication about noise; 4) lack of communica-
tion generally; and 5) concerns about respect and public
humiliation.
Mr. M. then asked Fran and Ed to express to one another how they
felt about being humiliated in public (Fran by the red lettered
message and Ed by the remark to his parents), and to discuss the
importance they place on feeling respected and comfortable in and
around their homes. After Fran and Ed had done so and were feel-
ing a little more empathetic and conciliatory toward one another,
Mr. M. then asked them to brainstorm possible options for remedy-
ing the noise and communication problems. He asked them to dis-
cuss their schedules and to consider how they both might better
pursue their favored activities without disrupting each other's lifes-
tyle. He encouraged them to consider how better communication
might provide avenues toward resolution.
In response, Fran and Ed began to articulate possible solutions, in-
cluding altering the timing of the parties, the logistics of Ed's motor-
cycle use, and the structure of their future interactions. After listing
a number of the proposed solutions on a large posterboard, Mr. M.
asked Fran and Ed to identify those options which appeared to
them most feasible and agreeable.
Fran and Ed, with Mr. M.'s help, winnowed down the satisfactory
options until they were left with a series of mutual agreements. Ed
28. Mediators repeat or "reflect back" the emotions contained in the parties' state-
ments to assure them that they have been heard and understood. CmRisToPHER W.
MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CoNnicr
165 (2d ed. 1996).
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agreed to schedule his parties on the frequent weekends when Fran
visited her sister. Ed also agreed to cut his motorcycle's engine one
block away from Fran's house and walk his bike the final distance.
Fran, in turn, promised to contact Ed directly if she had any prob-
lem with noise or any other behavior. In addition, Ed agreed to
repaint Fran's door, provided Fran supply the paint and write an
apology to his parents, which Fran agreed to do. Mr. M. then pre-
pared a written agreement which contained these terms. He then
made copies of the agreement for Fran and Ed and congratulated
them on a job well done.
As noted, Mr. M.'s treatment of Fran and Ed's dispute conforms
to the traditional "norm-generating" model of mediation. This pro-
cess typically consists of several stages: introduction, storytelling, ex-
change of views, option-generating, option-selection, and agreement
writing.29
The first stage is the introductory or contracting phase, in which
the mediator explains how the mediation will proceed and attempts to
establish rapport and put a sense of trust in the process.3 0 The next
29. Commentators differ in their enumeration and description of mediation's stages.
See e.g., FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 38-72 (describing mediation as a seven
stage process); KOVACH, supra note 12, at 24 (identifying nine necessary stages and four
optional stages); CHRISTOPHER N. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRAT-
EGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 32-33 (1986) (describing mediation as a 12-stage pro-
cess); John Haynes, The Process of Negotiations, 2 MEDIATION Q. 75, 86-87 (1983)
(describing mediation as a set of structured negotiations in which the parties pass through
three stages).
30. During this introductory stage, the mediator generally provides a brief explana-
tion of the process, explains that as a third party neutral she has no authority to impose a
settlement, discusses the confidential nature of the proceedings, sets several ground rules
to facilitate open and balanced exchange, obtains the parties' agreement to abide by the
ground rules, and explores the parties' commitment to resolving the dispute. See, eg.,
FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 38-47; ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 26, at 20-22;
Mary B. West & Joan M. Gibson, Facilitating Medical Ethics Case Review: What Ethics
Committees Can Learn from Mediation and Facilitation Techniques, 1 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HFEALTmcAR ETmIcs 63-74 (1992). Generally, the ground rules require that disputants
follow the mediator's directions regarding the process, agree to abide by whatever confi-
dentiality provisions are established, and avoid abusive behavior. The San Diego Media-
tion Center, for example, requires that disputants agree to: 1) follow the mediator's
instructions on when to address the mediator and when to speak directly to the other
disputant; 2) work seriously towards a resolution; and 3) treat each other with respect
throughout the mediation session. See SAN DIEGO MEDIATION CENTER, INTRODUCTORY
MEDIATION SKILLs TRAINING MANUAL 27-28 (1996) [hereinafter TRAINING MANUAL] (on
file with author); ADR GROUP INTERNATIONAL, INC., MEDIATION STUDENT MANUAL IV-
14 (1995) [hereinafter STUDENT MANUAL] (on file with author) ("There are certain ground
rules necessary to successful mediation. The primary rules are: 1) you do not interrupt
each other, 2) we will all treat each other with respect; 3) there will be no name calling or
insulting remarks.").
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stage is the storytelling or information gathering stage.3 1 At this point,
the mediator directs one of the parties to describe the conflict from
her perspective. In some versions, the mediator also asks the party to
identify what she would consider a "good outcome" and explain
why.3 2 The mediator seeks to elicit all relevant facts by asking open-
ended questions and seeks clarification where a disputant's telling of
the story is disjointed or confused.33 After both disputants have had
an opportunity to describe the conflict from their perspective, the me-
diator then summarizes the key issues that have emerged from both
parties' stories.3 4
In the next stage, the ordering or structuring stage, the mediator
sets the agenda for the rest of the mediation.35 Often, the mediator
pinpoints not only content issues, but also emotional concerns which
are inflaming the dispute and impeding the parties' ability to find
common ground.3 6 The mediator assists the parties in identifying
which issues are the most important and prioritizing the concerns un-
derlying each issue or demand. The goal of the mediator in this stage
is to provide some structure for the ensuing conversation, to break the
parties' dispute into manageable components, and to direct the parties
toward an organized and reasoned consideration of the elements of
their conflict. 37
Once an agenda is set, the mediator initiates the fourth stage-
the exchange of views.3 8 The mediator asks the parties to speak di-
31. See, eg., FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 47-49; NANCY H. ROGERS & RIcH-
ARD A. SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE LAW 22-27 (1987); West &
Gibson, supra note 30, at 64.
32. See CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, MEDIATION FOR THE PROFESSIONAL 17
(1996) [hereinafter CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETrLEMENT].
33. See e.g., Janet Rifkin et al., Toward a New Discourse for Mediation: A Critique of
Neutrality, 9 MEDIATION Q. 151, 161 (1991) (arguing that a successful mediator facilitates
"the production of a coherent narrative").
34. See, e.g., West & Gibson, supra note 30, at 64; TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 30,
at 31-40; KOVACH, supra note 12, at 107.
35. See, e.g., FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 49; West & Gibson, supra note 30,
at 64; KOVACH, supra note 12, at 111; Margaret L. Shaw, Divorce Mediation: Some Keys to
the Process, 9 MEDIATnON Q. 27 (1985) (discussing importance of agenda setting).
36. At the San Diego Mediation Center, mediators are trained to organize an agenda
that includes the parties' substantive concerns as well as the "blocking" issues-the emo-
tional components blocking each party's ability to hear and empathize with the other's
point of view. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 30, at 37.
37. See, e.g., KOVACH, supra note 12, at 111-14; MOORE, supra note 29, at 33; ROGERS
& SALEM, supra note 31, at 28-30.
38. In some models, the parties' exchange of viewpoints comprises a separate stage.
See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 30, at 39-44; see also Judy H. Rothschild, Dispute
Transformation, the Influence of a Communication Paradigm of Disputing, and the San
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rectly to each other, often on a topic unrelated to the issue in dispute.
This brief dialogue serves as an "ice-breaker," and encourages the
parties to view each other more empathetically. Individuals caught in
intractable conflict often demonize their adversary. The mediator's
goal in this stage is to reverse this negative imagery. He39 seeks to
structure a dialogue that will remind each party of the other's essential
humanity and of their common bonds. He helps create an environ-
ment where each party views the other as reasonable, with needs and
concerns that must be attended to.40
After the exchange, the mediator draws the parties toward the
option-generating stage. In this stage, the mediator encourages the
parties to brainstorm a range of possible solutions.4 The mediator
urges the parties to be creative and even fanciful in imagining possible
accords.42 The goal of the mediator during this stage is to help the
parties relinquish the positions that they have advanced throughout
the dispute and begin seeing the underlying issues in new and more
constructive ways.
The option-selection stage commences when the parties have con-
cluded their brainstorming and have begun evaluating the array of op-
Francisco Community Boards Program, in Tim PossmiLrrY oF POPULAR JusTIcE 265,291-
92 (Sally E. Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1993) (discussing the second stage of the San Fran-
cisco Community Board mediation model in which the parties are encouraged to talk to
each other about their feelings and develop an understanding of each other's perspective).
In others, the promotion of understanding and empathy between the parties is presented as
a generalized function which occurs throughout the mediation or in response to impasse.
See John M. Haynes, John and Mary: Sharing Parenting After Divorce, 21 MEDIATION Q.
23, 25-26 (1988) (describing mediation in which mediator encourages parties to "walk a
mile in the other's moccasins" to promote greater understanding and empathy); see also
Christopher W. Moore, Techniques to Break Impasse, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY
AND PRACrInE, supra note 17, at 251, 260-61 (explaining that mediators request parties
talk about their perceptions of the dispute and each other in an effort to dissolve negative
images and misperceptions); Alison Taylor, A General Theory of Divorce Mediation, in
DrVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 17, at 61, 73 ("Each partici-
pant must have the opportunity to understand the other's perspective in evaluating the
importance of a certain option. Each must feel that his or her perspective is understood by
the other.").
39. To avoid awkward instruction, I will use the pronoun "he," to signify he or she. I
use the male pronoun only to counteract the common stereotype that women gravitate
more frequently to low status helping professions than do men.
40. MOORE, supra note 28, at 169-72. Depending upon the level of animosity between
the parties and the behavior of one or more parties, this is not always possible.
41. See e.g., KovAcH, supra note 12, at 129-31; FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at
49; ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 31, at 30-33; West & Gibson, supra note 30, at 65.
42. Unconstrained and wide-ranging consideration of options is thought to increase




tions that have emerged. In this stage, the mediator aids the parties in
identifying principles or criteria with which to distinguish attractive
options from unattractive options.43 To this end, the mediator helps
manage the parties' exchange of concessions and compromises and
locate priorities and interests that can be traded for mutual gain. The
mediator's goal in this stage is to narrow the range of options being
considered and to move toward a solution that can be implemented
and that will satisfy each party's critical needs.44
In the final stage, agreement writing, the mediator reduces agree-
ments to writing. The mediator checks with each party to confirm that
the writing accords with each party's understanding of the agreements
assented to during the mediation.45 At this stage, the mediator may
probe the parties' ability to implement the agreement and its durabil-
ity over time.46 The mediator may also urge the parties to develop
contingency plans and strategies for coping with future conflict. 47 The
mediator's goal in this concluding stage is to ensure that the written
agreement represents a meeting of the disputants' minds, to probe the
parties' commitment and ability to carry out the agreement, and to
craft a mechanism for communication should further discord arise.48
In sum, the mediator introduces the parties to the process,
secures agreement to particular ground rules, facilitates an exchange
of viewpoints, structures an agenda, encourages brainstorming of pos-
sible options, assists in the selection of viable options, and records the
understandings reached, if any, in a written agreement. 49
Throughout the mediation, the mediator uses several techniques.
He encourages face to face communication between the parties and
engages in active listening, both to assure the disputants that he has
heard their concerns and to confirm that he has understood the issues
correctly.50 He probes and uncovers the underlying needs and inter-
ests animating the parties' stated positions.51 He terminates personal
43. See Folberg & Taylor, supra note 3, at 53-57; KOVACH, supra note 12, at 135.
44. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 30, at 45-48.
45. Id. at 50-52; FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 60-62; ROGERS & SALEM, supra
note 26, at 28; West & Gibson, supra note 30, at 65.
46. KOVACH, supra note 12, at 167-69.
47. Id. at 168; West & Gibson, supra note 30, at 65.
48. KOVAcH, supra note 12, at 163-70.
49. See MAKING ADR WORK FOR You, supra note 10, at 2-5.
50. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 30, at 79-80; West & Gibson, supra note 30, at
65.
51. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITH-
ouT GVING IN 41-43 (2d ed. 1991).
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attacks or other counterproductive conduct. 52 He assists the more
inarticulate party in identifying and explaining his position.:5 3 He con-
strains the more voluble party if that party's loquacity threatens to
silence the other disputant.5 4 He reframes and reorients disputant
comments so that they are more palatable to the other disputant.55
He shifts party focus from identifying past fault to determining future
remedies.5 6 He reframes conflict to permit more than one solution.5 7
He focuses the parties on their best and worst alternatives to settle-
ment58 and plays the "agent of reality" when one party's expectations
appear distorted.5 9 He uses humor, shock tactics, metaphors, and sto-
ries to create dissonance in the party's thinking and facilitate review of
52. See Albie M. Davis & Richard A. Salem, Dealing with Power Imbalances in the
Mediation of Interpersonal Disputes, 6 MEDIATION Q. 17,20-21 (1984) (urging mediators to
interrupt intimidating negotiating patterns).
53. Id. at 20 (stating that the mediator should compensate for a party's low-level ne-
gotiating skills).
54. See FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 57 ("Maintaining some sort of equality
in communication is important so that a verbose participant does not stifle the opinion of a
quiet or passive one."); Rifkin et al., supra note 33, at 161-62 (arguing that a mediator
should intervene to promote each disputant's ability to construct a coherent narrative).
55. KOVACH, supra note 12, at 108-09.
56. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100
YALE L.. 1545, 1563 (1991) ("It is typical for mediators to insist that parties waste no time
complaining about past conduct.., and focus only on the future.").
57. See FisHER ET AL., supra note 51, at 57 (identifying negotiators' search for "the
single answer" as one of four primary obstacles to creative problem solving).
58. Id. at 97-106.
59. See generally id. at 105; see also CENTER FOR DisPuTE SETTLEMENT, supra note
32, at 5 ("As agreement or its possibility nears, your (the mediator's) job is to increase each
party's awareness of the other's needs and to build a realistic framework within which they
can assess the costs and benefits of continuing or resolving the conflict."); Leonard Marcus,
Mediation, Arbitration, and Dispute Resolution, in RENEGOTIATING HEALTH CARE 317,
345 (Leonard J. Marcus et al. eds., 1995) (noting that the mediator assists each party in
realistically assessing options "in light of the recognized interests of the other"); Taylor,
supra note 38, at 72-74 (explaining that the mediator serves as agent of reality by making
"the participants doubt the assumptions and firmness of their original positions or percep-
tions"). Some mediators reality test by pointing out that the parties' expectations of how
proposed options would work or how a third party decisionmaker would resolve their dis-
pute are at odds with existing social or legal norms. See id. at 74 ("While mediators cannot
make decisions for participants, they can remind participants of the sociological and statis-
tical data about the options. Mediators in this situation have often reminded disputants of
community norms or values...."); JAMES C. FREUND, TiH NEUTRAL NEGOTIATOR: WHY
AND How MEDIATION CAN WORK To RESOLVE DOLLAR DIsPuTES 15-16 (1994) (arguing
that the mediator acts as agent of reality by persuading a party that he is overestimating
the strength of his legal position or putting an absurd value on what is at issue). A media-
tor who reality tests by examining a party's proposals in light of the other party's goals is
hewing to the norm-generating model. The mediator who reality tests by pointing out the




additional options.60 He uses flip charts or scratch paper to concretize
the elements in dispute and to provide visual evidence of the parties'
progress toward agreement. 61
In using these techniques, the mediator exercises considerable
control over the parties' interaction. Like a symphony conductor, he
directs the order, pace, tone, and pitch of dialogue. At no time, how-
ever, does the mediator serve as a constraint on the parties' power of
decision-making. He may question whether one party's demands are
realistic, given the needs articulated by the other. However, he does
not restrain deliberations by referencing concerns extrinsic to the par-
ties.62 That is to say, in the mediation model I have characterized as
"norm-generating," the mediator does not remove identified options
from consideration simply because those options conflict with existing
social norms.63 As one influential mediation text explains:
The ultimate authority in mediation belongs to the participants
themselves, and they may fashion a unique solution that will work
for them without being strictly governed by precedent or being un-
duly concerned with the precedent they may set for others. They
may, with the help of their mediator, consider a comprehensive mix
of their needs, interests, and whatever else they deem relevant re-
gardless of rules of evidence or strict adherence to substantive
law.64
The leitmotif of the norm-generating model, then, is its inatten-
tion to social norms. In an effort to spur innovative problem-solving,
the model situates party discussion in a normative tabula rasa. The
only relevant norms are those the parties identify and agree upon. As
Lon Fuller has explained, traditional or norm-generating mediation
60. See Robert D. Benjamin, The Constructive Uses of Deception: Skills, Strategies,
and Techniques of the Folkloric Trickster Figure and Their Application by Mediators, 13
MEDIATION Q. 3, 15-16 (1995) (describing the mediator's use of rhetorical sleights-of-hand
to dislodge parties from their entrenched positions).
61. STUDENT MANUAL, supra note 30, at VI-11.
62. See Sally E. Merry, Mediation in Nonindustrial Societies, in MEDIATION RE-
SEARCH 68, 85 (Kenneth Kressel & Dean G. Pruitt eds., 1989) (demonstrating that Ameri-
can mediators are less direct than nonindustrial mediators and "are more concerned about
achieving a lasting settlement than about enforcing societal norms"). As stated supra in
note 59, those mediators who reality test by referencing legal or social norms depart from
the traditional norm-generating model in favor of the norm-educating approach.
63. See MAKING ADR WoRK FOR You, supra note 10, at 2-7 (stating that mediation
is appropriate where resolution of the dispute is more important than the legal or moral
principles involved).
64. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 10. See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 56, at 1559-
61 (noting that mediation deemphasizes legal rules and principles, and accentuates a dis-
pute's context and constitutive relationships. In such a forum, "each person's interests are
important, but which person violated societal values and why he did so, is not.").
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"is commonly directed, not toward achieving conformity to norms, but
toward the creation of the relevant norms themselves. '65
The norm-generating model has obvious appeal. It appears ide-
ally constructed to promote disputant autonomy and satisfaction.66 It
promises more creative problem-solving 67 and avoids the rigidity and
legalism68 that attends more rule-based approaches. Although some
scholars contend that this model is appropriate for virtually every va-
riety of dispute,69 the model appears to offer greater benefits and pose
fewer harms in particular types of conflicts.70
65. Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305, 308
(1971).
66. A dispute resolution process furthers individual satisfaction when the process
"leave[s] the disputing parties feeling that their individual desires, as defined by them-
selves, have been satisfied, in terms of their experience and the outcome of the process."
Robert A. Bush, Defining Quality in Dispute Resolution, 66 DENv. U. L. REv., 335, 347
(1989). A dispute resolution process enhances disputant autonomy when it "strengthens
the disputants' capacity "to resolve their own problems without being dependent on exter-
nal institutions, public or private." Id. at 347-48. Many commentators and researchers
have concluded that mediation more effectively enhances individual satisfaction and auton-
omy than norm-based processes like litigation and arbitration. See e.g., Jessica Pearson &
Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: Reflections on a Decade of Research, in MEDIATION
RESEARCH, supra note 62, at 9, 27-29 (noting high level of user satisfaction with custody or
visitation mediation services); Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 30 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 422, 422 (1992) (Mediation "empowers the parties by enabling
them to be the ultimate decisionmakers, and it allows the parties to reach agreements that
take into account important facts that are often ignored in judicial decisionmaking. Medi-
ated agreements are much more likely to satisfy the parties to a dispute than are court
orders.").
67. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 754,768-75. But see Marc Galanter & Mia
Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 1339, 1376-77 (1994).
68. Judith Shklar uses "legalism" as a heuristic to stand for the subordination of moral
reasoning to legal reasoning. Legalism reduces moral relationships to the recognition of
"duties and rights determined by rules." JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS,
AND POLITICAL TRIALS 1 (1964). Legalism is problematic because it conflates morality
with obeisance to rules and focuses on rights to the exclusion of relationships and responsi-
bilities. See Bethany Spielman, Invoking the Law in Ethics Consultation, 2 CAmBRIMGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 457, 463 (1993).
69. See Joseph P. Folger & Robert A. Baruch Bush, Transformative Mediation and
Third Party Intervention: Ten Hallmarks of a Transformative Approach to Practice, 13 ME-
DIATION Q. 263, 278 (1996) (noting that a transformative, norm-generating approach is
found "in the work of intervenors using diverse processes in diverse conflict contexts, in-
cluding environmental and public policy interventions, team-building efforts in organiza-
tional and corporate settings, and international and interethnic conflict-handling
processes."). See generally BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 17, at 280-82 (arguing that the
advantages inherent in the use of a transformative, norm-generating mediation model ap-
ply equally in all kinds of cases).
70. The confidence that dispute types can be effectively matched with dispute resolu-
tion systems is not universally shared. Compare STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES, 435-37 (2d ed. 1992)
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B. Identifying Paradigm Case(s) for Use of the Norm-Generating Model
The norm-generating mediation model is well-suited to conflicts
in which the goals of enhancing disputant autonomy and preserving
relationships are paramount.71 In these conflicts, the particular out-
come reached is less important than the parties' active participation in
its construction. Often, empowerment and relational concerns are pri-
mary because the competing goal of "doing justice" through the appli-
cation of legal or social norms may not be possible, sensible or
conclusive. 72
and Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-
Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTATION J. 49, 50 (1994) (examin-
ing the suitability of various dispute resolution processes from the parties' and the public's
perspective) with Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A
Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. Rv. 1, 12 n.52
(1991) (stating that attempts to allocate different disputes to different dispute resolution
forms can only succeed at the margins, where the cases are "totally 'fact"' or "totally
'law"') and Bush, supra note 66, at 346 (arguing that the context of a dispute does not
significantly affect definitions of what constitutes a quality process, and, consequently, does
not affect the choice of process itself).
71. See ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 31, at 44-51. Rogers & Salem identify addi-
tional factors which, if present, would favor the use of mediation. These include: 1) the
courts do not provide the relief the parties are seeking; 2) the parties want to settle the
matter promptly and with minimal expense; 3) voluntary compliance with the disposition is
particularly desirable; 4) one or both of the parties want to avoid the establishment of
judicial precedent or a judgment that may have a preclusive effect; 5) the parties and their
lawyers have difficulty initiating negotiations and/or lack negotiating skills; 6) the parties
have differing appraisals of the relevant facts and law, 7) the dispute is polycentric, requir-
ing complex trade-offs; and 8) confidentiality is desirable.
72. The proposition that "justice" (a slippery concept itself) is defined and imple-
mented through the rule of law is a rather dubious one in many circles. See Mark Tushnet,
Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL
EDUJ. 505 (1986). Certainly, the application of legal norms in many situations yields re-
sults that offend instinctive notions of fairness. See McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760 (Mass.
1937) (holding insane defendant liable for battery, even though the impulse to strike is a
by-product of the mental illness over which defendant has no control). Still, generally
speaking, giving effect to legal norms in dispute resolution is thought preferable to ad hoc
decisionmaking for several reasons: 1) it imparts consistency in decisionmaking and en-
sures that like cases are treated alike; 2) it serves a guidance function, creating markers
which allow decisionmakers to order their future conduct according to known standards;
and 3) it reflects and buttresses the public values embodied in authoritative legal texts. See
generally Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TuL.
L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1987); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. 1073, 1089 (1984);
Judith Resnick, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 842-56 (1984).
Often, the inquiry as to whether alternative dispute resolution methods generate
"just" or "fair" outcomes has been answered by comparing mediated settlements with ad-
judicated settlements in similar cases. See Jessica Pearson, The Equity of Mediated Divorce
Agreements, 9 MEDIATION Q. 179 (1991); see also David Luban, The Quality of Justice, 66
DENV. U. L. REv. 381, 387 (1989). However, many scholars note that the proper basis of
comparison is not the "shadow verdict"-the likely outcome if the dispute went to court,
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Application of legal or social norms may be impossible for two
reasons. First, the parties may be disputing terrain where opposing
factions have articulated contradictory norms, but neither norm has
achieved consensus status in society. Thus, a conflict involving the
provision of arguably futile medical care would be suitable for norm-
generating mediation because no ethical or legal consensus exists re-
garding how futility is to be defined.73 No legal norm directs how
claims for futile care be treated.74
Second, the parties may be disputing in the interstices of public
regulation-in an area so private or of so little public concern that it
has not been the subject of regulation.75 Heated neighborhood dis-
putes often revolve around domestic practices that have not given rise
to legal restriction or guideline. Zoning ordinances do not ordinarily
specify when individuals shall work in their gardens, cook their meals,
or wash their clothes. Yet, all of these activities provoke discord. In
these types of conflicts, even if the goal of preserving relationships
were less vital, resolving the dispute by recourse to a legal standard
would prove futile because such a standard rarely exists.
but the "shadow bargain"-the likely result if the dispute were resolved in lawyer-domi-
nated negotiations absent the intervention of a mediator. Luban, supra, at 388. However,
to the degree that lawyer-dominated negotiations are heavily influenced by the likely adju-
dicated verdict, it is not clear how dramatically the shadow bargain diverges from the
shadow verdict in most cases. Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark- The Normative
Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REv. 1, 5 (1992). But see
Luban supra, at 400-01.
In a recent article on court mediation, Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley suggests that just
decisionmaking involves "making knowledgeable choices based on an understanding of
relevant law." Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice
Through Law, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 47, 75, 91 (1996). Although I would agree that just
decisionmaking is enhanced when parties understand the norms relevant to their dispute, it
is not clear to me that every instance of informed decisionmaking is just. Parties may,
under duress or dire straits, agree to vastly unequal distributions, knowing that they are
foregoing benefits to which they are legally entitled. Their knowing sacrifice does not
make the distribution just.
73. See Steven Miles, Futility and Medical Professionalism, 25 SErON HALL L. Rlv.
873, 875-76 (1995) (describing the futility debate as "a cacophony of proposals").
74. Compare In re Baby "K," 16 F.3d 590, 592 (4th Cir. 1994) (requiring hospital to
maintain infant on respirator despite the fact that treatment was arguably futile in light of
infant's anencephalic condition) with Virginia Health Care Decisions Act ("Nothing in this
article shall be construed to require a physician to prescribe or render medical treatment to
a patient that the physician determines to be medically or ethically inappropriate."). VA.
CODE Am. § 54.1-2990 (Michie 1994).
75. See Diane E. Hoffmann, Mediating Life and Death Decisions, 36 Aiz. L. REv.
821, 825 (1994) (arguing that, in mediation, disputed issues are presumed to be private and
best decided by the personal norms that the parties calibrate to their own relationship).
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In some disputes, application of legal or social norms may be pos-
sible but not sensible. This may be true where the norm is sufficiently
inconsequential when compared to competing objectives 76 such that it
may be overridden without fear of substantial harm to either the par-
ties or the public interest.77
To illustrate, imagine a dispute between neighbors. Neighbor A
has filed a claim against Neighbor B for tying a clothesline on a
branch of a tree rooted on Neighbor A's property. Neighbor B de-
fends that he has an easement because he has openly and continuously
used the tree to support the clothesline each year for the past ten
years. Legal norms do exist setting forth the conditions under which
the law will recognize an easement. However, those norms are
designed primarily to facilitate orderly relations between land-users,
not to safeguard essential societal values. It is more important that
these neighbors work out a compromise which allows them to happily
enjoy their property than to give voice to the values underlying the
law of adverse possession. 78
In a third type of dispute, application of legal or social norms
does not conclude the problem. Even where decisionmakers agree to
be guided by certain norms, disagreements may persist as to what spe-
cific outcome the norms require.79 For example, consider a custody
dispute between divorced parents. Both parents seek sole custody of
their five year-old son. The son has a close relationship with each
parent. The mother is a sophisticated urbanite. She resides in the
middle of a cosmopolitan city and possesses sufficient funds and lei-
sure to introduce her child to, in her words, "the finer things in life."
The father is a farmer raising crops and livestock in a rural area sev-
76. These objectives may be any goals the parties wish to achieve by pursuing an
informal, nonlegal dispute resolution process. These objectives may include: 1) preserving
relationships; 2) maintaining confidentiality; 3) encouraging self-determination; and 4) dis-
posing of the dispute cheaply and swiftly. See KOVACH, supra note 12, at 40-41 (listing
party objectives and case characteristics which render mediation appropriate).
77. See, e.g., Hoffmann, supra note 75, at 862 (explaining that mediation is appropri-
ate where "[tlhere is little or no state, societal or institutional interest in the outcome of the
dispute-the ramifications of the agreement will be felt only by the disputing parties, there
will be no significant externalities to the agreement").
78. For an empirical study demonstrating one cattle-ranching community's allegiance
to informal community constructed norms, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT
LAW (1991) (demonstrating that cattle-ranchers disregard legal doctrine and instead apply
self-generated norms that maximize the objective welfare of the group).
79. Hoffmann makes this point when she notes that disputes well-suited to mediation
"may be framed as having more than two mutually exclusive outcomes." Hoffmann, supra
note 75, at 861. Where guiding legal norms are indeterminate, multiple outcomes may be
consistent with these norms.
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eral hours from the city. The father, while busy on the farm, can offer
the boy a wholesome, bucolic setting, complete with farm animals,
house pets, and an abundance of land to play on and explore. The
relevant legal standard dictates that the custody decision be made "in
the best interests of the child."80 Here, both parents can offer the
child different, but arguably equally valuable experiences.
Application of the legal norm in this instance does not tilt the
decision in either direction. Good arguments exist that the child's
best interest would be advanced by awarding the mother sole custody
because she can offer the child a stimulating cultural education.
Equally good arguments suggest that the father should be awarded
sole custody because of the healthy, safe, and robust environment that
he can provide his son. The "best interest" standard is, in this case,
indeterminate.8' It allows for several different, but equally satisfac-
tory outcomes.
In many disputes, the value to the disputants of forging a swift,
economical and self-determined resolution dictates the use of a norm-
generating mediation model. In these instances, often no social norm
exists. If one exists, it is too indeterminate to settle the dispute or too
inconsequential to warrant strong consideration. However, not every
dispute is so configured.
H. The Norm-Educating Process Using Mediative
Techniques
A. The Development of Norm-Educating and Norm-Advocating
Mediation
As noted earlier, mediation first attained widespread use in this
country in labor negotiations and community disputes.8s The norm-
generating model which evolved in these contexts fits comfortably
80. See In re Donna W., 472 A.2d 635, 644 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (reviewing trial
court's custody determination to ascertain whether best interest standard was correctly
applied).
81. Numerous commentators have argued that the best interest standard is indetermi-
nate under any set of facts. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 957 (1979).
82. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. Some scholars locate the antecedents
of American mediation in colonial practices and the local, autonomous, and insular concili-
ation boards of immigrant groups. See generally AUERBACH, supra note 21, at 25;
FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 3-4. Although scholars chart the growth of various
mediation "movements" differently, compare MURRAY ET AL., supra note 4, at 290 (char-
acterizing family disputes as "an early arena for application of mediation") with Daniel G.
Brown, Divorce and Family Mediation: History, Review, Future Directions, 20 CONCILLA-
TON CTs. REv. 1, 11-20 (1982) (dating inception of the family mediation movement in the
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with the subject matter of those disputes. The collective bargaining
topics most frequently and successfully handled in mediation involve
salary, sick leave, working hours, and other conditions of employ-
ment.8 3 In these types of confficts, the bargaining frequently occurs
between relative equals.84 Furthermore, discussions of salary and va-
cation time, absent extreme and outrageous party demands, do not
ordinarily call into play defined social norms or principles. The same
can be said where two neighbors are arguing over the volume at which
one plays music late at night.
However, once mediation began to play a role in the resolution of
divorce, environmental, criminal, and civil rights disputes, critics be-
gan to express concern about the process' inability to assimilate and
apply social norms to the problems at hand.85 The opportunity media-
tion created for parties to dictate the norms that would guide the solu-
tion to their dispute began to appear, to some, as a threat to the
mid to late 1970s), most agree that mediation attained its first and most visible niche in
labor/management and neighborhood disputes. See KOVACH, supra note 12, at 19-20.
83. One study of 104 cases mediated by the British Advisory, Conciliation, and Arbi-
tration Service (ACAS), revealed that 73% of all disputes surrounding issues of pay and
other conditions of employment were resolved, while only 46% of the disputes concerning
union recognition and other nonsalary matters reached a settlement. According to the
authors, this finding is unsurprising because "issues involving pay and related matters more
readily lend themselves to compromise solutions than issues that do not involve a continu-
ous scale, such as recognition. Also, in disputes concerning recognition or matters of hiring
and firing, positional commitments and dedication to principles often do interfere with the
exchange of concessions." Jean M. Hiltrop, Factors Associated with Successful Labor Me-
diation, in MEDIATION RESEARCH, supra note 62, at 241, 246-47.
84. Management and worker representatives are usually equally well-informed and
wield relatively equal power in the mediation. Consequently, labor mediators can confi-
dently assume that a fair and balanced agreement will emerge through the parties' robust
assertion of self-interest. See Schwebel et al., supra note 17, at 216; Pamela S. Engram &
James R. Markowitz, Ethical Issues in Mediation: Divorce and Labor Compared, 8 MEDIA-
TION Q. 19, 21-22 (1985).
85. See, e.g., AUERBACH, supra note 21, at 145 ("[A]lternatives prevent use of courts
for redistributive purposes in the interest of equality, by consigning the rights of disadvan-
taged citizens to institutions with minimal power to enforce or protect them."); No Accrnss
TO LAW (Laura Nader ed., 1980); Brunet, supra note 72, at 17 ("Proponents of compromise
solutions that ignore positive law give too little weight to the substantive policies that the
positive law promotes."); Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures
in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 482, 590 (1987) (expressing
concern that mediation of employment discrimination claims may compromise complain-
ant rights because "[m]ediation owes no allegiance to established norms, and one party's
sophistication may prejudice the other party in achieving a just or fair result"); Lawrence
Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. Rnv. 1, 14-18
(1981) (arguing that mediators of environmental disputes should ensure that the substan-
tive decisions reached in mediation create good precedent and take into account the inter-
ests of unrepresented third parties).
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continued articulation and enforcement of principles that society
holds dear.86
Feminists, for example, argued that channeling support and cus-
tody issues into a process which often excluded lawyers and eschewed
"rights-talk" deprived women of the fruits of divorce law reform.88
86. See generally Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in 1 THu
PoLrncs OF INFoRMAL JusTicE 267, 267-320 (Abel ed., 1982). Owen Fiss and Richard
Delgado are two important spokespersons for this view. Owen Fiss, in his declamation
against ADR, argues that informal settlement buys peace between the parties at the ex-
pense of public values. Fiss, supra note 72, at 1085. Fiss views litigation as a mechanism
for "using state power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals." Id. at
1089. Dispute resolution systems, Fiss writes, should seek
not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to
explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the
Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into ac-
cord with them. This duty is not discharged when the parties settle.
Id at 1085.
Richard Delgado and colleagues make a similar point in concluding that informal dis-
pute resolution is likely to disadvantage racial and ethnic minorities. According to Del-
gado's syllogism, a liberal democracy such as our own prizes equality and other values
important to disadvantaged classes. Because ADR fosters compromise and concession, it
cannot advance these equality norms as well as does formal litigation. For this reason,
"ADR may work against the best interests of the disadvantaged." Richard Delgado et al.,
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution,
1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1399 (1985).
87. See Susan Silbey & Austin Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholar-
ship: From Institutional Critique to the Reconstruction of the Juridical Subject, 66 DENY. U.
L. REv. 437, 472-96 (1989) (noting that the adversary system is occupied with identifica-
tion, elaboration, and defense of rights, while the alternative dispute resolution system
shifts attention to individual interests and needs).
88. The feminist critique of mediation is voluminous. Trina Grillo's diatribe against
mandatory child custody mediation, for example, portrays mediation as dangerous for wo-
men generally, and black women in particular. Grillo, supra note 56, at 1565, 1572-81. In
her article, Grillo argues that mandatory mediation precludes women from "naming" (per-
ceiving injurious experiences), "blaming" (transforming these experiences into grievances),
and "claiming" (asserting rights). This short-circuiting of the rights-claiming process,
Grillo contends, stymies women's healthful post-divorce development and denies them the
entitlements formal adjudication would provide. Id at 1565. See, eg., Penelope E. Bryan,
Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BuFF. L. REv. 441,523
(1992) ("[W]omen will obtain more advantageous outcomes when negotiating lawyers rely
on law than when mediators rely on vague and biased equity norms."); Harry T. Edwards,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668, 679 (1986)
("In the last ten years, women have belatedly gained many new rights, including new laws
to protect battered women and new mechanisms to ensure the enforcement of child-sup-
port awards. There is a real danger, however, that these new rights will become simply a
mirage if all 'family law' disputes are blindly pushed into mediation."). See generally
Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HAv. L. REv. 727 (1988) (arguing that mandatory child
custody mediation disadvantages women because mediators are biased in favor of joint,
rather than sole, custody arrangements, even where the mother served as primary care-
taker of the children throughout the marriage); Carol Lefcourt, Women, Mediation and
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Others critiqued the application of mediation to criminal offenses,8 9
arguing that Victim-Offender Mediation (VOM) devalues the substan-
tive and procedural norms observed in public prosecutions. 90 The me-
diation of public policy and environmental disputes sparked similarly
framed debates. 9' Who, it was asked, would advance society's interest
in preserving scarce resources? Who would protect the rights and en-
titlements of those not directly involved in the mediation? Viewing
mediation as a broadside assault on the rule of law, one observer ad-
vised that lawyer-mediators evaluate the fairness of any mediated
agreement according to its approximation to the likely adjudicated
outcome. 92
Family Law, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 266,267 (1984) (arguing that increasing use of fam-
ily mediation "undermines efforts and achievements by women in the family law arena").
For a summary of the salient themes in these critiques, see Ellen Waldman, The Role of
Legal Norms in Divorce Mediation: An Argument for Inclusion, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L.
87, 114-20, 123-27 (1993).
89. See Roman Tomasic, Mediation as an Alternative to Adjudication: Rhetoric and
Reality in the Neighborhood Justice Movement, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: AssEssMErNT
OF AN EMERGING IDEA 215, 237-42 (Roman Tomasic & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 1982);
Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and
the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1808, 1808-10 (1986);
Gynn Davis et al., Reparation in the Service of Diversion: The Subordination of a Good
Idea, 27 THE HOWARD JOURNAL 127, 133 (1988) ("[R]eparation is being seen as something
outside justice, or instead of justice. It is a device whereby our machinery for resolving
these matters-questions of fairness and obligation, innocence and blameworthiness-
need not be brought into play."). For a more recent critique, see Jennifer G. Brown, The
Use of Mediation To Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.. 1247
(1994).
90. Brown, supra note 89, at 1251. Brown decries VOM's neglect of state criminal
law, and its neglect of the retributive and deterrent goals of the criminal justice system
generally. Id. at 1297-1301.
91. See Susskind, supra note 85, at 7-8 ("If the key parties involved in an environmen-
tal dispute reach an agreement with which they are pleased, but fail to take account of all
impacts on those interests not represented directly in the negotiations, the public health
and safety could be seriously jeopardized."). But see Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and
Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. Ruv. 85, 86 (1981) ("Suss-
kind's demand for a nonneutral intervenor is conceptually and pragmatically incompatible
with the goals and purposes of mediation.").
92. See Judith L. Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case for Mediator Ac-
countability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 503, 515 (1991). To ensure that mediation does not
supplant established legal norms, Maute would replace ethical rule 2.2 governing lawyer
intermediaries with a new ethical rule governing lawyer-mediators. This rule would
require:
When the parties are not separately represented, the mediator may prepare a
written agreement resolving the dispute subject to the following conditions:
(1) the terms approximate a likely adjudicated outcome, or the parties are
adequately informed and voluntarily agree to different terms;
(2) the parties are informed of their right to seek independent legal advice,
and urged to do so when the agreement addresses important legal rights;
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The mediation field responded to these concerns. Disputes sur-
rounding issues where societal norms are clear and compelling93 may
still be mediated. However, what is termed mediation in these spe-
cialized areas often constitutes a norm-based process utilizing media-
tive techniques.
One variety of norm-based mediation is the norm-educating
model. Below, I describe the norm-educating model, canvass its use
in a number of different contexts, and suggest the paradigm case for
its application.
B. A Description of the Norm-Educating Model Using Mediative
Techniques
What follows is an example of the norm-educating model applied
in a divorce dispute. While the model is now used in a variety of set-
tings, it is perhaps most closely identified with divorce mediation
practice.
Dan and Linda had been married 15 years when they decided to
divorce.94 Dan earns $65,000 a year; Linda earns $300 a month as a
part-time secretary at the local church. She is resistant to the di-
vorce, but knows she cannot prevent it. They have two daughters,
Denise, age three, and Marie, age nine. They have been separated
for five months. In that time, Dan has had very little contact with
Denise and Marie. To avoid acrimony and expense, Dan and Linda
have decided to mediate their divorce.
At the first mediation session, the mediator, Ms. K., provided Dan
and Linda detailed information about the goals and assumptions of
the mediation process. She showed them a copy of her Rules and
Guidelines (Rules) which discuss confidentiality, courtesy, the
nonrepresentational, neutral role of the mediator, and the necessity
of obtaining outside counsel to review whatever mediated settle-
ment is reached. In addition, the Rules require the parties to re-
frain from selling marital property or incurring large debts without
first obtaining the other's approval. She then inquired briefly about
(3) the lawyer may not knowingly finalize an agreement reasonably believed
to be illegal, grossly inequitable, or based on false information.
Id. at 515.
93. As discussed infra at notes 140-46, compelling social norms are important in the
sense that they confer bargaining endowments on traditionally marginalized parties and
protect unrepresented third parties. Social norms that embody the principles of equality,
fundamental rights, and individual dignity are compelling. Even compelling social norms,
however, may be waived or disregarded in situations where such waiver will not seriously
disadvantage either the parties or the public at large.
94. This scenario is loosely based on one divorce mediator's account of a case "typical
of the more than 500 divorce cases" that he has mediated. Stephen K. Erickson & Marilyn
S. McKnight Erickson, Dan and Linda. A Typical Divorce Mediation Case, 21 MEDIATIONQ. 3 (1988).
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their most pressing issues. She learned that, for Linda, finances
presented the most urgent problem, while, for Dan, his scant con-
tact with his children was his greatest concern. After securing from
both a commitment to the mediation process, Ms. K. then asked
them to independently fill out a six-page questionnaire providing
property, income, expenses, and other financial information before
meeting for a second session.
Having assessed Dan's concern about not seeing his children as the
most urgent, Ms. K. began the next session by suggesting that they
begin talking about the children and custody issues. Ms. K. rede-
fined the custody issue by explaining that the discussion was not
about who would control the children, but rather an exploration of
how both Dan and Linda could continue to be the kind of parents
they wished to be. Ms. K. asked Dan and Linda to speak briefly
about their hopes and fears about post-divorce parenting and to de-
scribe the parenting arrangements throughout the separation.95 Af-
ter learning about the ad hoc arrangements that had developed, Ms.
K. explained that current psychological data reveals that most
couples and children benefit from having a definite exchange sched-
ule. In this way, each family member can plan and be certain about
his or her schedule. Ms. K. then drew a twenty-eight box grid on a
ffipchart, with each box standing for a day of the month, and began
to work with Dan and Linda on developing a custody and visitation
plan that would accommodate their own, and the children's sched-
ules. The presence in Dan's apartment of Dan's new girlfriend was
a sticking point for Linda. However, when Ms. K. reflected back to
Linda her resentment toward the woman and probed the lack of
connection between the girlfriend's presence and the children's abil-
ity to spend quality time with their father, Linda dropped the objec-
tion. By the end of the session, they had worked out a temporary
schedule for the next month.
At the next session, Ms. K. complimented the couple on reaching
agreement concerning the children and suggested moving to the fi-
nancial issues. Both Dan and Linda listed their income and ex-
penses and constructed a budget of what they needed to survive.
Ms. K. pointed out that given their combined income and expenses,
the couple as a whole were 786 dollars short each month. Ms. K.
suggested that couples generally chose one of four options when
facing a shortfall: 1) cutting expenses; 2) increasing income; 3) bor-
rowing from assets; or 4) using tax-planning principles to reduce
taxes, thereby yielding more income to meet their needs.
After Dan and Linda explained to each other the basis for some of
the expenses listed, they agreed to divide the shortfall equally. Dan
did state, however, that the finances would be easier if Linda would
get a real job instead of "volunteering" her time at church. Linda
expressed interest in developing a more lucrative career, and Ms. K.
suggested she give some thought to a plan to increase her earning
95. The mediator in Dan and Linda: A Typical Divorce Mediation Case did not en-
gage in this intervention. See Erickson & Erickson, supra note 94. However, many other
divorce mediators do. See Haynes, supra note 38, at 25-26.
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potential. Dan was asked to obtain detailed information about his
pension plan.
At the next session, when Linda began to talk about her financial
future, it became clear that schooling was essential. Linda's nursing
studies had been interrupted by the marriage, and she now wished
to continue those studies. Dan, however, did not want to pay the
$4,000 per year tuition. Dan stated that Linda could pay for the
tuition and books from her 1/2 share of the $18,000 money market
account they planned to divide equally. Linda felt Dan should pay
for tuition since she had dropped out of nurse's training in the first
year of their marriage to help Dan obtain his M.B.A. degree. When
Linda queried Ms. K. if she had a right to a share in Dan's M.B.A.
degree, the mediator replied that several courts, particularly New
York State Courts, had ruled that a wife had an ownership interest
in her husband's medical degree.96
As the conversation degenerated into bickering over who had
worked harder at the marriage, the mediator interrupted, shifting
the focus from the past to the future, from casting blame to solving
problems. Ms. K. advised,
I'm quite sure that if I sat here for the next three hours and
listened to both of you, I would never be able to figure out all
the facts exactly the way they happened. In fact, you didn't
hire me to listen to the two of you present evidence about why
Linda is now dependent on the marriage for support. I'm sure
that each of you would have made very different choices during
the last fifteen years had you known you would be sitting in my
office today.
Ms. K. then pointed out that Linda and Dan shared a mutual desire
to facilitate Linda's economic independence from Dan and sug-
gested they work at brainstorming ways to accomplish that goal.
They ultimately agreed that Linda would receive $14,000 from the
money market account, and Dan would receive $4,000. Ms. K then
wrote up the custody and financial agreements in a memorandum,
and sent a copy to Dan and Linda, with copies to their attorneys to
file with the court.
96. See Erickson & Erickson, supra note 94, at 17. In the actual case, the author/
mediator expressed his opinion that "it is probably easier to see the husband's degree as
something that allows him to earn an income permitting him to pay spousal support." Id.
Rather than treating the degree as a property asset, the mediator "encouraged them to
view it as another aspect of the spousal support decision." Id.
Scant precedent exists for mediator suggestions based on how the mediator personally
thinks issues might best be approached. While it is acceptable practice for mediators to
reference social norms and evaluate disputant proposals according to those norms, it is less
acceptable for mediators to evaluate or suggest that disputants adopt evaluative criteria
based on the mediator's idiosyncratic views. But see JOHN M. I-IAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIA-
TION 135 (1981) ("Although the mediator has the responsibility to honor the choices of the
clients, this must always be tempered by the mediator's values.... When the values of the
mediator and those of either or both of the couple clash too sharply, the mediator has a
responsibility to discuss this with the couple.... If these differences cannot be compro-
mised, either the couple will quit or the mediator should terminate them.").
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Clearly, the model which Ms. K. employed is similar in many
ways to the model which Mr. M. used. Ms. K. proceeded through the
standard mediation stages, beginning with an introduction to and ex-
planation of the process, and moving on to story telling, agenda-set-
ting, option-generating, option-selection, and, finally, the concluding
agreement writing stage.
In addition, Ms. K. availed herself of the full panoply of media-
tive techniques displayed by Mr. M. She engaged in active listening,
reframed issues so as to avoid a win-lose perspective, encouraged em-
pathic understanding of opposing views, separated needs from posi-
tions, helped the parties generate and evaluate options according to
explicitly articulated criteria, and refocused the parties on the future
instead of the past.
Ms. K.'s approach differed from Mr. M.'s, however, in her refer-
ence to relevant social and legal norms, which she used to provide a
baseline framework for discussion of disputed issues. She adverted to
these norms twice: first when Dan and Linda were beginning to con-
sider what sort of custody and visitation arrangement to adopt, and,
second, when questions arose as to whether Dan should be required
to pay Linda some share of her tuition. In the first instance, the medi-
ator educated the parties about existing norms in the child psychology
field. 97 In the second, the mediator informed the parties about pre-
vailing legal norms.98
Ms. K. did not insist that the parties' agreement implement these
norms.99 It is likely that if Dan and Linda both strongly desired to
retain a visitation schedule that was ad hoc and changeable from day-
to-day, the mediator would have assisted them in codifying that agree-
ment.100 Similarly, if Dan and Linda both agreed that Dan's M.B.A.
97. See, e.g., Judy C. Cohn, Custody Disputes: The Case for Independent Lawyer-
Mediators, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 487, 517 (1994) (suggesting mediators use parenting
experts and cite professional opinions on the effect of various custody arrangements on
children in order to educate parents and focus them on their children's needs). For an
example of the type of professional opinions that a mediator might reference in educating
parents about child development, see ROBERT E. ADLER, SHARING THE CHILDREN: How
TO RESOLVE CUSTODY PROBLEMS AND GET ON WITH YOUR LmE 207-18 (1988).
98. The legal norm allocating compensation to a spouse who contributed financially
toward the educational degree of the other spouse is well-established. See, e.g., In re Mar-
riage of Fahy, 567 N.E.2d 552 (I11. App. 1st Dist. 1991) (holding that professional degree is
not marital property, but that working spouse's financial contributions to student spouse
should be considered in the distribution of marital assets).
99. Neither did the mediator upon whom Ms. K. is based. See Erickson & Erickson,
supra note 94, at 14-18.
100. It should be noted, however, that some mediators would not accede to this type of
arrangement. When mediation disputants propose to deviate from social norms in ways
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could fairly be excluded from all consideration, the mediator would
likely have supported that conclusion, so long as she felt that the par-
ties understood the implications of their decision. 01
This model, then, is a norm-educating model which utilizes medi-
ative techniques. Contrary to the norm-generating model, where dis-
cussion of societal standards is thought to impede autonomy and
distract parties from their true needs, this model's consideration of
that seriously threaten third party interests, many mediators would advocate for inclusion
of those norms, thus shifting to the norm-advocating model. See, e.g., Donald T. Saposnek,
What is Fair in Child Custody Mediation?, 8 MEDIATION Q. 9, 10 (1985) ("Although the
child custody mediator is not explicitly burdened by the task of deciding justice for the
child, there nevertheless exists an implicit ethical and moral responsibility for the mediator
to influence a settlement that, in his or her opinion, seems at least in the adequate if not
best interests of the child."); The Association of Family and Conciliation Courts' Model
Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation, Standard VI (B), in NANCY H.
ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE, App. D, at 18
(1994) ("The mediator has a responsibility to promote the participants' consideration of
the interests of children and other persons affected by the agreement"); Joseph P. Folger &
Sydney E. Bernard, Divorce Mediation: When Mediators Challenge the Divorcing Parties,
10 MEDIATION Q. 5, 15 (1985) (reporting study in which a majority of mediators surveyed
rejected parties' proposed settlement because it failed to consider the needs of the parties'
children). Similarly, some mediators would not sign an agreement in which an impover-
ished wife released a financially secure husband from the obligation of paying any child
support, because such an agreement would subvert the principle that children should not
unduly suffer from their parents' decision to separate. See, e.g., HAYNES, supra note 96, at
127-128 (asserting that a successful divorce mediation creates no victims and enables the
children "to develop and maintain an ongoing relationship with both parents").
In certain court-referred child custody programs, enabling statutes require advocacy in
favor of an agreement that benefits the divorcing parties' child(ren). See KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-603(a)(8) (1995) (requiring that the mediator "ensure that the parties consider fully
the best interests of the children"); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3180(b) (West 1994) ("The media-
tor shall use his or her best efforts to effect a settlement... in the best interest of the child
However, the dividing line between the norm-educating and norm-advocating model
is a gray one. Much commentary, but little agreement, exists on the appropriate course of
action when disputants contemplate an agreement that threatens harm to a third party. See
David Greatbatch & Robert Dingwall, Selective Facilitation: Some Preliminary Observa-
tions on a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators, 23 LAW AND Soc. REV. 613, 615 (1989)
("The tension between the professed commitment to self-determination and the imposition
of an overriding ethical code remains unresolved by the mediation movement.").
101. See, e.g., John Lande, Mediation Paradigms and Professional Identities, 4 MEDIA-
TION Q. 19,37 (1984) (arguing that people's purposes should take precedence over particu-
lar rules, policies, and procedures when necessary to achieve substantive justice); Marlow,
supra note 18, at 11 (explaining that legal norms, while not dispositive in mediation, may
serve an instrumental purpose in "resolving the disagreement when all else fails"); Stephen
K. Erickson, The Legal Dimension of Divorce Mediation, in DIVORCE MEDIATION 105-06
(Jay Folberg & Ann Milne eds., 1988).
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social norms is thought to enhance autonomy by enabling parties to
make the most informed decisions possible. 0 2
C. Uses of the Norm-Educating Model in Multiple Settings
This model is most visible in the divorce arena. The mid-eighties
divorce mediation literature reveals skirmishes between those who
thought that divorce mediation should mirror the generic norm-gener-
ating model' 0 3 and those who believed that disputants should be edu-
cated about the norms encoded in family law.104 Today the battle has
largely subsided. Most commentators agree that a divorce mediator
should have some familiarity with family law issues. 0 5 Descrip-
tions of ongoing programs reveal that the mediator is active in
ensuring that disputant negotiations are informed by relevant
legal and social norms, 10 6 either by educating the parties him-
self'07 or by ensuring that they are educated by retained counsel. 03
102. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 72, at 86-95 (arguing that in court-based mediation
programs, parties should be informed of their legal rights); Nancy J. Foster & Joan B.
Kelly, Divorce Mediation: Who Should Be Certified, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 665, 668 (1996)
(stating that divorce mediators must be familiar with family and tax law in order to educate
spouses about their legal entitlements and liabilities); CENTER FOR MEDICAL ETHICS, ME-
DIATION AND MEDICAL ETHICS: PROGRAM AND TRAINING MANUAL 2, 9 (1993) (on file
with author) (defining mediation as process of "assisted decision-making" that provides
participants "the best opportunity to reach an acceptable, durable agreement," achieved in
part through the "[g]athering [of] necessary quality information").
103. See Waldman, supra note 88, at 96-100.
104. See, e.g., Foster & Kelly, supra note 102, at 668; STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR
FAMILY MEDIATORS, Standard IV(C) (Family Law Section of the American Bar Associa-
tion 1983), reprinted in 17 FAM. L.Q. 455, 458 (1984) (recommending that mediators en-
deavor to assure that mediation participants are fully apprised of relevant statutory and
case law by advising them to "obtain independent legal representation during the
process").
105. See LINDA R. SINGER, SETrLING DIsPUTES 40 (1994); Foster & Kelly, supra note
102, at 668.
106. Divorces implicate a number of different legal norms, including the rules which
define and allocate community property, establish child and spousal support, and clarify
the rights and obligations of custodial and non-custodial parents. Relevant social norms
include psychological data illuminating the appropriate criteria for determining custody
and visitation arrangements.
107. See Carol Bohmer & Marilyn L. Ray, Regression to the Mean: What Happens
When Lawyers are Divorce Mediators, 11 MEDIATION Q. 109 (1993) (discussing attorney-
mediators' practice in Georgia of educating divorcing spouses about relevant legal issues);
GARY J. FRIEDMAN, A GUIDE TO DIVORCE MEDIATION: How TO REACH A FAIR, LEGAL
SETLEMENT AT A FRACTION OF THE CosT 31 (1993) (arguing that a mediator's job in-
cludes making sure that the parties have all the information-practical, economic, and
legal-necessary to make "solid" decisions); see also Kenneth Kressel, Frances Butler:
Questions That Lead to Answers in Child Custody Mediation, in WHEN TALK WORKS:
PROFILES OF MEDIATORS, supra note 19, at 17,28, 42-43 (describing child custody media-
tor Frances Butler's directive style. Butler informs parents about child development re-
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The norm-educating model, however, is not restricted to the di-
vorce context. Court-referred cases, whose subjects range from bank-
ruptcy,10 9 to real property,"10 to wrongful termination,' are likely to
be "mediated" in the thick shadow of the law. 1 2 In Florida, a state
search and legal issues. According to Butler, "the workings of the legal machinery are not
a mere hazard; a knowledge of the legal mechanism can ... be a significant benefit by
helping to point the way out of the legal quagmire into which the parties have tumbled.").
See also FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 151-53 (recounting child custody medi-
ation where mediator informs recalcitrant father seeking to limit the visitation rights of his
in-laws, "[m]ore and more, the courts have been recognizing the rights of grandparents to
visit their grandchildren after divorce"); FLORENCE BIENENFELD, CHILD CUSTODY MEDIA-
TION 10 (1983) (stating that as a mediator, she functions as an educator, "focus[ing] on
teaching parents about the process of divorce and about their children's needs"); Adryenn
Cantor, Mediation and Family Law, CAL. BAR J., 24, 24 (1995) ("The mediator's role at
this juncture is to facilitate ongoing negotiations between the parties, using certain media-
tion skills.., such as exploring whether the law, after it is explained to the parties, should
be set aside for the parties' own equitable considerations."); Cohn, supra, note 97, at 502
(arguing that only lawyers should perform child-custody mediations "because a lawyer-
mediator knows the legal system and knows the law").
108. Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Ap-
proaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MIN. L. REv. 1317, 1357-73 (1995)
(describing divorce mediation program where lawyers play an active role, both in inform-
ing parties of relevant legal norms and persuading parties to abandon claims that would be
rejected by a court, if the divorce were to be litigated). See Mark C. Rutherford, Lawyers
and Divorce Mediation: Designing the Role of "Outside Counsel," 12 MEDIATION Q. 17,
28-29 (1986) (suggesting that outside counsel can fulfill primary function of "ensur[ing]
that society's, third parties', and the participants' interests are protected," while serving
primarily as a neutral); Penelope E. Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism" The Lawyer's
Role in Divorce Mediation, 28 FAv. L.Q. 177,217-18 (1994) (arguing that attorneys should
help clients formulate the result to be insisted upon in mediation and should prevent ma-
nipulation throughout the process).
109. See Ralph R. Mabey et al., Expanding the Reach of Alternative Dispute Resolution
in Bankruptcy: The Legal and Practical Bases for the Use of Mediation and the Other
Forms of ADR, 46 S.C. L. REv. 1259 (1995).
110. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1355(f) (West 1982) (requiring ADR processes in certain
homeowner association disputes); see also Michael E. Klingler, Practice Tips: Representing
Clients in Real Estate Mediations, 14 CAL. REAL PROP. J. 16, 24 (1996) ("Mediation is
becoming the forum of choice for resolving most real estate disputes.").
111. See Matthew Mosk, Judges Will Employ Mediators in Effort to Resolve Disputes,
L.A. TiMES, July 19, 1993, at BI (explaining that judges in Ventura Courts are likely to
refer wrongful termination cases to mediation because of the emotional component em-
bedded in these cases).
112. Numerous statutes authorize local courts to mandate mediation in particular
cases. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.060 (Michie 1996); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1775-
1775.16 (West Supp. 1997) (limiting mediation to cases where amount in controversy is less
than $50,000); IOWA CODE § 598.41(2)(d) (West 1996 & Supp. 1996); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch 211B, § 19 (West Supp. 1996) (authorizing chief justice for administration and
management to establish pilot ADR program in various counties where properly screened
cases will be sent to mediation); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752 (West Supp. 1994); OR.
REv. STAT. §§ 107.755-95 (1995); see also ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 100, at 7:02,
and App C. and 1996 Supp.
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where court-sponsored mediation has grown exponentially," 3 many
mediators employ a "trashing" style, dissecting the flaws and weak
points in each disputant's case according to prevailing legal norms.114
Further, the Florida rules governing court-appointed mediators ac-
knowledge the use mediators make of legal rulings and standards by
explicitly allowing mediators to provide legal information to dispu-
tants, provided the mediator is qualified to do so."15
A growing number of statutes require or allow for the mediation
of disputes arising under their provisions." 6 The statutes, however,
clearly contemplate that the parties' negotiations will be informed by
the duties and obligations created by statute, and, thus, implicitly re-
quire a norm-educating approach.1 7 In California, for example, the
special education law creating educational entitlements for disabled
children allows for mediation of those disputes arising under its terms.
The law specifies that mediators must be knowledgeable regarding the
113. In 1991, nearly 50,000 cases filed in Florida were mediated, an increase of roughly
16,000 cases from 1989. FLORIDA DISPUTE RESOLUTION CTR., FLORIDA MEDIATION/AR-
BITRATION PROGRAMS: A COMPENDIUM, at viii and accompanying charts (1992), cited in
Robert B. Moberly, Ethical Standards for Court-Appointed Mediators and Florida's
Mandatory Mediation Experiment, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 702, 702 (1994). Legislation
authorizing trial judges to mandate civil litigants mediate before pursuing their claim in
court accounts for much of this dramatic growth. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.1011-.108
(West Supp. 1997) (renumbering and amending FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.301-.08 (1988)).
114. See James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of
"Good Mediation?," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 47, 66-68 (1991). The other identified media-
tor styles are bashing and hashing. The bashing mediators chip away at the settlement
figures brought to the table until the parties meet somewhere in the middle. Id. at 68-71.
The hashing mediators most closely approximate the norm-generating model. The hashers
approach the process flexibly, rely more on direct communication between the parties, and
view themselves as orchestrators and referees rather than the hammer that pounds out a
settlement. Id. at 71-73.
115. See FLA. R. FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS § 10.090(a)
(1996). The Mediation Center of Kentucky also appears to utilize a norm-educating
model. While Center mediators do not represent parties, in their role as agents of reality,
mediators do provide information regarding relevant legal norms and will offer general
guidance about how those norms might be applied if the dispute were to proceed through
the adversary system. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Quiet Revolution Comes to Ken-
tucky: A Case Study in Community Mediation, 81 Ky. L.J. 855, 899-900 (1992-1993).
116. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.355 (Michie 1996) (breach of motor vehicle war-
ranty disputes); HAW. REv. STAT. § 205-5.1(e) (1993 & Supp. 1995) (geothermal energy
development disputes); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3341 (West Supp. 1996) (land use
mediation program); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2851-2859 (1990 & Supp. 1994) (med-
ical malpractice); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.305 (1990 & Supp. 1994) (adoptive child disputes).
For a more extensive listing of statutes that provide for mediation of related disputes, see
ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 100, at App. C and 1996 Supp.
117. In some instances, where the disputants are likely to enjoy vastly disparate power
and where important third party interests are at stake, the statute might contemplate a
norm-advocating model.
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laws and regulations governing special education.118 Detailed obser-
vation of the mediations conducted by one experienced special educa-
tion mediator revealed that the parties' negotiations take place in a
"domain in which the bargaining is not merely in the shadow of law,
but the law and institutional practices made available by law are ac-
tively shaping both the mediation and the outcomes." 119
The norm-educating model figures prominently in employer-em-
ployee grievance disputes. When Talk Works, 20 a book profiling
twelve well-respected mediators, devotes one chapter to the practice
of William Hobgood, an established grievance mediator. It details his
handling of a dispute over disciplinary action taken against a union
member.' 21 In that dispute, Hobgood sought both to attain a fair out-
come for Rosie, the union worker threatened with dismissal, and to
improve safety in the employer's mine for all workers. 22 Working
with published company rules, Hobgood informally evaluated the
parties' chances in arbitration, explaining how the collective bargain-
ing agreement and company rules would likely be interpreted in Ro-
sie's case."23 Hobgood made clear that the parties could ignore his
interpretation of the applicable norms as set forth in labor-manage-
ment agreements. However, explanation of the norms and their likely
implications was an important part of Hobgood's method.124
118. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56504.5 (West Supp. 1997).
119. Susan S. Silbey, Patrick Davis: "To Bring Out the Best... To Undo a Little Pain,"
in WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS, supra note 19, at 64 (emphasis in
original).
Sibley's portrait of Davis' work illustrates how the principles embodied in the special
education statutes sculpt Davis' practice. In the first stage of the mediation depicted, Da-
vis does not simply describe the mediation process to the parties, he discusses the legal
requirement that children be placed in the least restrictive educational environment; see
also Nolan-Haley, supra note 72, at 56 (noting that special education mediation practice
has modified the traditional understanding that in mediation "individualized notions of
fairness, justice, morality, ethics, and culture may trump the values associated with any
objective framework provided by law.").
120. See WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS, supra note 19.
121. See Deborah M. Kolb, William Hobgood: "Conditioning" Parties in Labor Griev-
ances, in WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS, supra note 19, at 149.
122. Id. at 157-58, 183.
123. Id. at 178-82. See also Peter Feuille, Why Does Grievance Mediation Resolve
Grievances?, 8 NEGOTATION J. 131, 139 (1992) ("[T]he crucial feature of the mediator's
role is the ability, as an experienced arbitrator, to inform the parties of the contractual
strength or weakness of their grievance position."); Peter Feuille & Deborah M. Kolb,
Waiting in the Wings: Mediation's Role in Grievance Resolution. 10 NEGOTIATION J. 249,
252 (1994) (describing mediator's prediction of how the grievance would be resolved if
taken to arbitration as the "center-piece" of the mediation process).
124. Kolb, supra note 121, at 179-80 ("Hobgood argues that... 'it is the threat of
arbitration that makes mediation work"'); see also Rolf Valtin, The "Real and Substantial"
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Employers have also developed in-house mediation programs in
an effort to stem the rising tide of discrimination, sexual harassment,
and wrongful termination claims.125 While not explicitly conceived as
such, these programs typically adopt a norm-educating orientation.
The procedures adopted by Science Applications International Cor-
poration (SAIC), a high-tech, employee-owned company, provide one
example. SAIC's Employee Dispute Resolution Guide [hereinafter
Guide] sets out a four stage dispute management program in which
mediation constitutes the third stage. 126 Although any employee may
pursue the first two stages, management review and appearance
before an appeals committee, 27 only employees with complaints in-
volving legally protected rights may proceed to mediation.' 28 The
Guide describes the mediator as a third party who opens up communi-
cations, identifies options, and offers an objective perspective. 129
SAIC, however, only utilizes mediators with an employment law back-
ground. 30 The "objective perspective" is, thus, informed by judicial
norms and standards.
Corporate counsel and employment law attorneys frequently ex-
tol the virtues of mediation as nipping potentially costly employee dis-
Benefits of Grievance Mediation, 9 NEGOTIATON J. 179, 182 (1993) ("[G]rievance media-
tion does not mean that the disputants proceed with sweetness and light, magnanimously
reaching out for each other. They are still scrapping over contractual rights and obliga-
tions. However wide-ranging the discussion may become, attentiveness to contractual
rights and obligations is inescapable.").
125. See, e.g., Howard A. Simon & Yaroslav Sochynsky, In-House Mediation of Em-
ployment Disputes: ADR for the 1990s, 21 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 29 (1995); see also John W.
Zinsser, Employment Dispute Resolution Systems: Experience Grows But Some Questions
Persist, 12 NEGOTIAnTON J. 151 (1996) (describing the four-tiered dispute resolution system
of a large private construction firm which includes both informal and formal mediation).
126. SAIC's EMPLOYEE DIsPUTES RESOLUTION GUIDE 4-14 [hereinafter GUIDEJ (on
file with author).
127. Management review involves employee discussions with supervisory personnel.
The Guide explains the review as "a voluntary process that allows you (the employee) to
talk to your immediate supervisor or to a higher level of management without retaliation."
See GUIDE, supra note 126, at 4. The appeals committee consists of a fellow employee, a
member of the Technical Environment Committee, a manager from another department,
and the corporate human resources director. Appearance before the appeals committee
allows the committee to review the employee's problem and recommend solutions. lId at
6.
128. See GuIDE, supra note 126, at 8. Mediation is deemed appropriate for discrimina-
tion, contract, and tort claims, as well as claims for violation of any federal, state, or admin-
istrative law or ordinance. Id.
129. Id.
130. Interview with Bob Levin, Corporate Counsel, SAIC (June 24, 1996).
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putes in the bud.131 However, this praise is reserved for the norm-
educating model of mediation. Those who laud the use of mediation
in the employment context clearly assume that the mediator will be
familiar with the relevant legal standards and will be able to offer in-
formation about how a judge or arbitrator would likely view the
case.
32
The swift growth of mediation in the workplace prompted the
American Arbitration Association to convene a consortium of gov-
ernment officials, corporate and union representatives, and plaintiff
and management attorneys to discuss issues related to alternative dis-
pute resolution in the workplace.133 The group established a protocol
for the mediation of statutory disputes arising out of employment re-
lationships. 134 Designed to safeguard the due process rights of em-
ployees, the protocol requires the incorporation of legal norms into
the process.' 35 The protocol's centerpiece rests on improving media-
tor training and competence in employment and discrimination law.
It notes that "the existing cadre of labor and employment
mediators . . . although skilled in conducting hearings and familiar
with the employment milieu... is unlikely, without special training, to
131. See Jane Bowling, Business Turning to ADR to Avoid or Cut Short Litigation,
WARFiELD'S BusrNmss RECORD, Jan. 29, 1996; Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Shouldn't We Make
Full Disclosure to Our Clients of ADR Options?, AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE-AmERiCAN
BAR ASSOCIATION COURSE OF SrUDY, Dec. 7,1995, available in WL at CAOI ALI-ABA
125, at 131-32; Stuart H. Bompey & Gary R. Siniscalco, The Settlement Process in Employ-
ment Discrimination Litigation: A New Perspective, in PRAcTICING LAW INSTITUTE L1TIGA-
TION AND AD nmSmnTrE PRAcncE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, June 5-6, 1995,
available in WL at 522 PLI-LIT 329.
132. See Bowling, supra note 131, at 14 (quoting Timothy J. Geckle, Vice President and
Deputy General Counsel of The Ryland Group Inc., "They're [the mediators] the ones
who are playing the bad guy and saying 'Your case is a lousy case. You need to think about
this and understand the risk. Defendant, you've got to understand that there's risk. You
could get hit with this kind of result."'); Fitzpatrick, supra note 131, at *131 ("They [the
mediators] candidly discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each party's position as well as
possible means of resolution."); Bompey & Siniscalco, supra note 131, at *385-86 ("An
additional benefit of mediation is that both sides have the opportunity to hear how a
knowledgeable neutral reacts to their respective versions of the events at issue without in
any way being bound by the reaction. This not only will assist the former or current em-
ployee in assessing the claim, but it also should aid the employer in shifting from a defen-
sive posture to a problem-solving orientation. In short, it provides 'a reality check' for
both sides, which can then evaluate the risks and costs of litigation and, in turn, define
what they are willing to give or take in settlement.").
133. See William K. Slate II, Protocol Devised in Employment Conflicts: Resolution of
Workplace Disputes Can be Achieved Through ADR, THm LEGAL INrELiGENCER, Nov.
13, 1995, at 11.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 12.
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consistently possess knowledge of the statutory environment in which
these disputes arise . ... 136 To remedy the problem, the protocol
calls for training in statutory issues and suggests that such training be
required of all mediators and be updated periodically.137
The norm-educating model of mediation is viable and ex-
panding. 38 It has been adopted in both private and public sector pro-
grams. Legislators, judges, advocates, policy makers, and mediators
are attracted to this model because it allows for more expeditious, in-
novative, and congenial 39 dispute resolution, without wholesale sub-
version of established social norms. It appears particularly
appropriate for disputes with certain features.
D. Identifying Paradigm Case(s) for Use of the Norm-Educating Model
Like the norm-generating model, the norm-educating model is
appropriately used in disputes where party autonomy and relational
concerns are the preeminent values for consideration. Yet, in these
conflicts, unlike in disputes that call for the norm-generating model,
application of social or legal norms is possible, conclusive, and rela-
tively compelling. These disputes invoke norms that embody certain
societal conclusions about what is just and unjust and confer entitle-
ments on those who might otherwise remain disadvantaged and
marginalized in private bargaining. Elsewhere, I have called these
norms "protective norms" because they serve to protect one (or both)
of the parties from exploitation or abuse.14° Norms that require pay-
ment of permanent spousal support to a nonworking spouse after
breakup of a long marriage, or prohibit the firing of an elderly worker
solely because of his age could be characterized as protective norms.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Waldman, supra note 21, at 723, 743-48 (reporting survey results in which a
majority of San Diego Superior Court mediators inclined toward a norm-educating media-
tion model when confronted with divorce, personal injury, and employer-employee case
studies); Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place on the Law-
yer's Philosophical Map?, HAMINE J. OF Pun. L. AND POL'Y (Spring 1997) (forthcoming)
(on file with author) (noting that 83.1 percent of lawyers practicing in Hennepin County,
Minnesota who responded to a questionnaire from the state supreme court reported that
they seek mediators who have substantive experience in the field of law related to the case.
Additionally, approximately two-thirds of responding lawyers say that mediators fre-
quently or always propose realistic settlement ranges.). These data suggest that Hennepin
County mediators discuss legal norms in mediation with some frequency.
139. See Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Adjudication, 10 Omo ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 211, 246 (1995) ("ADR is perceived to
be friendly, flexible, and nicer than the uncivil exchanges that characterize litigation.").
140. See Waldman, supra note 21, at 739.
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These standards grant rights to the displaced homemaker or termi-
nated employee and safeguard both from impoverishment and rank
injustice. Because these norms are protective in design and effect, it is
important that parties be informed of their existence before making
decisions which unknowingly dispense with the conferred
entitlements.
The fact that a dispute implicates norms of which the parties
should be informed does not, however, imply that the parties must
adopt or implement them. In disputes calling for the norm-educating
model, the parties' interests in reaching settlement, even a settlement
that disregards social and legal norms,141 outweigh whatever societal
interest exists in the application of those norms. Disputes in which
party interests in settlement subordinate societal interests in norm-
enforcement often share certain qualities.
First, the parties approach the mediation with sufficient resources
such that their waiver of a legal entitlement does not appear coerced
by circumstance. Although the parties may not enjoy equal power,
they each possess sufficient competency that a decision to settle for
less than the law might award represents a conscious, capable expres-
sion of will rather than a capitulation to oppressive conditions. 142
Second, the resolution of these disputes will primarily affect only
the parties or entities at the table. The parties' resolution will not
adversely affect third parties absent from the mediation. Equally im-
portant, while the dispute calls into play protective norms, they are
not implicated so profoundly that their bypass will weaken social
bonds and do violence to important public values. In certain contexts,
the disregard of a protective norm, such as the antidiscrimination
norms embodied in civil rights or gender equality legislation, creates a
ripple effect. Far from affecting only the disputants, it places signifi-
cant strains on the social fabric and casts doubt on the power and
influence of the norm and its centrality in American life and institu-
tions. A settlement in which one waitress trades her right to be free of
141. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEo. L.J. 2663, 2677 (1995)
("[P]arties may use settlement precisely to have other, nonlegal, principles structure their
disputes and relationships.... [P]eople and entities in disputes may have a wide variety of
interests (of which legal principles may be one class) and may decide that, in any given
case, social, psychological, economic, political, moral, or religious principles should govern
the resolution of their dispute.").
142. Clearly, distinguishing free consent from coerced surrender is no easy task. See id
at 2670 (challenging those who would develop a jurisprudence of settlement to consider
"[w]hen is 'consent' to a settlement legitimate and 'real,' and by what standards should we
(courts and academic critics) judge and permit such consent?").
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admiring but objectifying comments at work for higher pay is less dis-
turbing from a public policy viewpoint than a class action settlement
in which thousands of women workers "agree" to continue to work in
an obscene, insulting, and intimidating environment.143 The norm-ed-
ucating model is only appropriate in conflicts in which the relevant
norms may be disregarded without weakening the ideals upon which
our government and legal structure are based.
To further concretize this discussion, consider the custody dispute
discussed in Part One. Imagine that both parents are relatively stable,
resourceful, and powerful people. Imagine too that the father is
threatening to withhold child support from the mother if she does not
allow him to take the children five months of the year. In this situa-
tion, it is important that both parties be alerted to the legal norms
which require noncustodial parents to pay child support, even when
they object to existing custody arrangements. This norm protects both
the child as well as the custodial parent, usually the mother.
Now, with this information, the mother may agree to the pro-
posed seven-five month split, even though a court might have awarded
her primary custody over the children for eleven and a half months of
the year, and the same amount of child support being offered by the
father. If so, the mother's desire to avoid a judicial proceeding and to
settle for "less" than she might have obtained in court should be
respected, so long as her decision is not forced or coerced.
Another important consideration involves whether the arrange-
ment is beneficial or harmful to the child, a third party whose interests
are unrepresented at the mediation. If norms in the field of child de-
velopment indicate that such an arrangement would be detrimental to
the child, as it would likely be if the child were school age, then argua-
bly the parents should not be allowed to waive the standards estab-
lished by those norms.
Waiver of legal norms should also be discouraged if the resulting
agreement would seriously undermine the norms of gender equality,
as it would if the child support payments were so low as to represent
an effective abandonment of the mother and child. Arguably, the "di-
vorce revolution" of the last twenty years represents a societal com-
mitment (though not entirely successful) to avoid the impoverishment
143. Were counsel for the female Mitsubishi workers to settle their class action sexual
harassment lawsuit against Mitsubishi for a minimal increase in salary, such public policy
concerns would be primary. See Leon Jaroff, Assembly-Line Sexism? Charges of Abusing
Women-and Angry Denials-Rock a Midwestern Mitsubishi Auto Plant, TimE, May 6, 1996,
at 56.
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of women and children following divorce. Private agreements which
do injury to this commitment should be discouraged.
If, however, the parties' proposed custody and child support ar-
rangement imperils neither the child nor the mother, and avoids seri-
ously compromising the norms of gender equality, the parties should
be permitted and encouraged to adopt and abide by it. Agreements
which deviate from the legally determined outcome are permissible
and encouraged, so long as the benefit to the parties outweighs any
harms created.
The norm-educating model of mediation strikes a compromise
between those who would bar discussions of law entirely from media-
tion practice and those who would outlaw mediation because it strays
too far from the normative moorings of our adversary system. It
stands for the proposition that the parties should be educated about
their legal rights. However, if one or both of the parties decides to
waive those rights, the mediator does not object. The norm-educating
mediator views the parties, not society, as rightful possessor of the
dispute. Consequently, the parties may, if they choose, reach a resolu-
tion that does not correspond entirely with societal norms.
This model, then, may be sensibly applied in disputes where the
social or legal norms implicated are sufficiently important that the dis-
putants should be made aware of them-but, the position of the par-
ties and the context of the dispute does not demand their
enforcement. 144 In other words, the disputant benefited by these
norms may waive them, and such waiver is unproblematic, both from
the disputant's and society's vantage point.
Although parties under this model may waive their rights and en-
titlements, such waivers, in the face of complete knowledge, seem less
likely to occur and will likely be less dramatic than in the norm-gener-
ating mediation model.145 Moreover, such rights-waivers, if made
144. I realize that this prescription is stated in such broad terms that it confounds pre-
cise application. Reasonable people may, and assuredly will, differ in their judgment as to
which values should trump when. The task of matching a mediation model to an individual
case is an undeniably contextual one. A full exploration of how this matching may be
accomplished is beyond the scope of this article. My goal here is simply to sketch out one
set of factors for consideration and future refinement.
145. See Carol Bohmer & Marilyn L. Ray, Effects of Different Dispute Resolution
Methods on Women and Children After Divorce, 28 FAm. L.Q. 223 (1994) (comparing di-
vorce settlements obtained by women in Georgia and New York in three separate fora:
mediation, litigation, and a judicially assisted service. In Georgia, where lawyer-mediators
informed parties of their legal rights, the mediated outcomes closely tracked the outcomes
obtained in judicial settings. In New York, where most mediators are mental health profes-
sionals, women were disadvantaged, receiving fewer monetary rewards).
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knowingly, may represent a party's conscious trade-off to obtain an
alternate form of satisfaction. In such a situation, the legal right has
served as an important bargaining chip,146 and, to the degree that the
legal entitlement has empowered one party to advance claims that she
would otherwise be poorly situated to assert, the right has served its
purpose; the norm has been effectuated. Thus, if a disgruntled em-
ployee, fired after alleging discriminatory treatment by a supervisor,
waives her right to sue for wrongful termination in return for rein-
statement, back pay, and contrite assurances of more respectful treat-
ment, the legal norm prohibiting retaliatory discharge has, to some
degree, been respected.
In some contexts, however, the norm-educating model is insuffi-
ciently protective of party and societal interests. This is true when the
power imbalance between the parties is so extreme that one party can-
not provide a trustworthy waiver, when the institutions administering
mediation have a mandate to enforce statutory law, and/or when the
dispute involves public resources or implicates public values in such a
profound way that their enforcement outweighs the disputants' inter-
ests in achieving settlement. In these instances, a norm-advocating
model better suits the task at hand.
m. The Norm-Advocating Process Using Mediative
Techniques
The following mediation case illustrates the model I term norm-
advocating. It involves an ethical conflict which has arisen in the
course of patient care.147
A. A Description of the Norm-Advocating Model
Jennifer, an eighteen year old patient in the hospital intensive care
unit (ICU), has Von Recklinghausen's disease ("elephant man dis-
ease"), a disfiguring condition in which the body is beset with
growths, both internal and external. A tumor has developed on her
neck, closing off the trachea and preventing her from breathing
without mechanical support. Surgical removal of the tumor would
enable her to breathe on her own. Jennifer, however, has refused
the surgery, saying that she has suffered enough. Jennifer maintains
146. See RONALD DwomnxN, TAKiNG RiGHrs SERIOUSLY 91 (1978); see also Mnookin
& Kornhauser, supra note 81, at 968-69 (arguing that because negotiations take place in
"the shadow of the law" legal entitlements may serve as bargaining endowments in
negotiations).
147. This case was described in greater detail in NANCY N. DU3LER & LEONARD J.
MARcus, MEDIA 1ING BIoEmncAL DisPurrs 44-47 (1994). The version presented here
represents a slight condensation and variation of the original.
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that the removal of the tumor will mean more pain and will do noth-
ing to diminish the anguish, disablement, and disfigurement caused
by her incurable condition. The attending physician in the ICU has
bowed to Jennifer's refusal and has directed nurses to remove Jen-
nifer from the ICU to a private room to die. He has further ordered
that morphine be provided when needed.
The primary care physician is challenging this care plan and has
called a consult with the bioethics mediator employed by the hospi-
tal. He tells the mediator, "How can we assist Jennifer in commit-
ting suicide? She doesn't truly know what she is doing."
The bioethics mediator assembles all the parties involved in Jen-
nifer's case, including the ICU attending physician, the primary care
physician, the primary nurse, the social worker, and a member of
the psychiatry liaison service. The mediator begins by explaining
that the purpose of the meeting is to achieve a meeting of the minds
regarding Jennifer's care, and expresses the hope that an exchange
of views and information will yield a resolution acceptable to all
involved.
The mediator next moves into the "story-telling" phase, asking each
caregiver to describe his or her understanding of Jennifer's medical
history and present condition, including an assessment of Jennifer's
mental state. All parties agree on the central facts of Jennifer's dis-
ease; however, there is some disagreement about her mental state.
The primary care physician feels that Jennifer's decision is "sui-
cidal," and suggests that she is not competent to determine the
course of her care. The other parties agree with the attending phy-
sician's assessment that Jennifer is a mature and knowledgeable
young adult, and, given her dire condition, her decision to refuse
surgery is an eminently rational one.
After hearing the parties' understanding of the relevant medical
facts and the controversies, the mediator constructs an agenda. She
states that the issues seem to be whether the medical staff can or
should ethically accede to Jennifer's refusal, and, if so, what care
plan can be developed concordant with Jennifer's wishes and the
medical staff's values.
The mediator asks the liaison psychiatrist to explain to the group
the criteria for assessing patient capacity and then asks the psychia-
trist to evaluate Jennifer's condition according to those criteria. The
psychiatrist states that Jennifer does not appear to be clinically de-
pressed; she appears able to understand the medical information
conveyed, to appreciate its relevance to her condition, and to weigh
the risks and benefits of the various alternatives. Thus, the psychia-
trist states, in his view, Jennifer has the capacity to make important
medical decisions.
The mediator next explains the ethical and legal consensus sur-
rounding patient decisions to forego life-sustaining treatment. The
mediator makes the following points:
1) Medical ethicists and courts distinguish between suicide, an
act whose primary purpose is to cause death, and refusal of life-
sustaining treatment, an act which seeks to avoid further bur-
densome medical treatment or disease-induced suffering.
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When patients refuse treatment, their primary goal is to avoid
extreme suffering; death is not their immediate object but the
unavoidable by-product of their decision. Crucial differences
in intent and causation differentiate permissible refusal of
treatment from prohibited suicide.148
2) The right of a decisionally capable patient to refuse life-sus-
taining care is based in the common law right of self-determina-
tion and in the constitutional right of liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 149
3) Many of the patients whom Dr. Kevorkian helped to die
were not terminally ill. Even without treatment, they stood to
live months and perhaps years with their disease. Dr. Kevor-
kian's machinery, not the underlying disease process, termi-
nated those patient's lives. In Jennifer's case, her tumor will be
the underlying cause of death.
The mediator's discussion reassures all medical staff that they can
ethically go along with Jennifer's refusal. Disagreement persists,
however, about how Jennifer is to be treated during the dying pro-
cess. The mediator encourages the nurses and physicians to discuss
their views on what medically and ethically should be done. The
nurses express discomfort with the attending physician's order to
remove Jennifer from her familiar surroundings in the intensive care
unit, feeling that would be a form of abandonment. They are fur-
ther uncomfortable with the provision of the amount of morphine
ordered by the attending physician to keep Jennifer comfortable,
fearing that will "cause" her death.
The mediator brainstorms with the parties, asking them to consider
what options are available for allowing the present staff to continue
caring for Jennifer, consistent with her decision. The mediator fur-
ther informs the caregivers of ethics opinions promulgated by the
American Nursing Association and the American Medical Associa-
tion stating that "the secondary effect of hastening death is not a
barrier to the necessary and effective use of pain medication." The
mediator cites additional bioethics literature which encourages ade-
quate provision of analgesia in terminal illness and locates the ethi-
cal difficulty in the failure to properly manage care at the end of life,
not in morphine's side effects on respiratory function.
Because once Jennifer is removed from the respirator her death will
likely be swift, one nurse proposes to keep Jennifer in the ICU with
the staff she knows, ensuring that she is provided sufficient pain
medication to avoid "air hunger" or other suffering. This option
148. See ALAN MEISEL, TiE RIGHT TO Dm 66-69 (Supp. 1995) (discussing judicial ra-
tionales distinguishing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from
suicide).
149. See; e.g., Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375,381 (Cal. 1993) ("The common law
has long recognized this principle: A physician who performs any medical procedure with-
out the patient's consent commits a battery irrespective of the skill or care used."); see also
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,277-78 (1990) ("The principle that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.").
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ultimately commands universal agreement. By the end of the dis-
cussion, all parties, nurses and physicians, are comfortable with Jen-
nifer's decision and a care plan that permits her to remain in the
ICU until her death.
In this model, the mediator proceeded through the familiar stages
common to the norm-generating and norm-educating models, using a
repertoire of standard mediative techniques. In the introduction, she
explained the mediation process to the parties. In the story-telling
stage, she elicited from each party his or her perception of the rele-
vant facts and issues. Next, she set an agenda, urged the parties to
exchange ideas and brainstorm possible solutions, aided the parties in
identifying the most realistic and satisfactory options for implementa-
tion, and then distilled the common ground reached into a written
care plan.
In this process, however, the mediator not only educated the par-
ties about the relevant legal and ethical norms, but also insisted on
their incorporation into the agreement.150 In this sense, her role ex-
tended beyond that of an educator; she became, to some degree, a
safeguarder of social norms and values. She apprised the parties of
relevant social norms, not simply to facilitate the parties' informed
decisionmaking and provide a beginning framework for discussion;
she provided information about legal and ethical norms to secure their
implementation. 151
150. No health care provider is obligated to initiate a consultation to resolve an ethical
dispute. See John A. Robertson, Clinical Medical Ethics and the Law: The Rights and
Duties of Ethics Consultants, in ETmIcs CONSULTATION IN HEALTH CAPE 161 (John C.
Fletcher et al. eds., 1989) (explaining that most institutions do not require ethics review or
consultation). And a bioethics consultant's authority is generally limited to making recom-
mendations to the parties. See John C. Fletcher & Maxwell Boverman, The Evolution of
the Role of an Applied Bioethicist in a Research Hospita in ETmICS CONSULTATION IN
HEALTH CARE, supra, at 89. Further, the parties are not obligated to follow the consult-
ant's recommendation. Id at 90 ("When the bioethicist and a senior physician disagree
about a proper course of action in a particular case, the bioethicist must withdraw after
giving a recommendation and informing the physician's superior about the disagree-
ment."). Thus, a mediator-consultant's "insistence" that the parties agreement concur with
existing norms is limited by the fact that the parties may ignore this "insistence" if they
choose. But see Susan M. Wolf, Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a
Community of Caring, 50 MD. L. Rnv. 798,822-23 (1991) (arguing that ethics committees,
by virtue of their claim to ethical expertise, exercise more power than their rhetoric
suggests).
151. See DUtLER & MARcus, supra note 147, at 43 (explaining that the boundaries of
inquiry in any mediated bioethical dispute are set by "a finite catechism" of "ethical princi-
ples and legal rules" which "are central to and confine the process of mediation").
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B. Uses of the Norm-Advocating Model in Multiple Settings
Although the norm-advocating model is less widespread, it is
used to resolve a variety of conflicts, including bioethical, 152 envi-
ronmental,' 53 zoning,' 54 and, in some instances, discrimination
disputes. 55
Environmental disputes involving public resources are often me-
diated via a norm-advocating model. In Breaking the Impasse, Law-
rence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank provide a theory of public
policy dispute resolution and discuss several high proffle environmen-
tal disputes that were successfully resolved through norm-advocating
mediation.' 56 Successful environmental mediations, they make clear,
cannot be achieved merely by empowering the parties to decide mat-
ters according to their own agenda.' 57 Rather, a successful mediation
must both follow and set good precedent. 58 The resulting agreement
should meet the same tests as agreements generated in "conventional
judicial, administrative, and legislative mechanisms.' 159
152. DUBLER & MARcus, supra note 147; see, e.g., Mileva Saulo & Robert J. Wagener,
How Good Case Managers Make Tough Choices: Ethics and Mediation, 2 J. CARE MGrr.
10, 37 (1996) (describing a case manager mediating a dispute between an HMO plan mem-
ber and her insurance provider. The mediator analyzed the case to identify the relevant
ethical principles (autonomy, beneficence, and justice) and worked to achieve an allocation
of health care resources that met a "clinically acceptable standard.").
153. See infra notes 156-168 and accompanying text.
154. See Barbara Filner & Michael Jenkins, Performance-Based Evaluation of
Mediators: The San Diego Mediation Center's Experience, 30 U.S.F. L. RIv. 647, 651
(1996) (discussing code violation mediation in which parties negotiated a resolution that
conformed to relevant zoning regulations); see also CENTER FOR MutICn'AL DisPUT RES-
OLUTION, PROGRAM INFORMATION (1994) (on file with author) (discussing San Diego Mu-
nicipal Court mediation program devoted to the mediation of zoning and other public
policy disputes). The Center conducted its mediations within the framework established by
local zoning ordinances. The Center's goal was to facilitate settlements that substantially
complied with the regulations while improving constituent satisfaction and saving the city
both time and money. Filner & Jenkins, supra, at 651. Interview with Susan Quinn, former
director of the Center (July 12, 1996).
155. See infra notes 190-203. This should by no means be considered an exhaustive list
of the uses of norm-advocating mediation, but simply an illustrative sampling.
156. See generally LAWRENCE SussKiim & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING TIM IM-
PASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIc DIsPUTES (1987).
157. Id. at 21-25
158. Id. at 25.
159. Id. at 150. See also Lawrence E. Susskind, Mediating Public Disputes: A Response
to the Skeptics, 1 NEGOTIATION J. 117, 119 (1985) (suggesting that mediation should further
larger societal goals, as well as the parties' interests: "When mediating public disputes, the
goal is not to extract successive concessions from the parties or merely to settle differences
through compromise .... The wise resolution of public disputes requires that attention be
given not only to the interests of the parties at the table but also to the needs and concerns
of future generations, diffuse interests and groups unable to articulate their interests effec-
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Winsor Associates, an environmental mediation practice group,
recently completed a mediation between the Pennsylvania Power and
Light Company (PP&L) and the Pennsylvania Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection (DEP).16° PP&L, like many other utilities, had
used PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls, a carcinogen) as an insulator
in transformers.161 PP&L knew that transformers at some sites had
leaked, contaminating the utility pole and the surrounding soil. 162 Be-
cause existing environmental codes mandated that PCB concentration
not exceed certain levels, many of PP&L's sites required examination
and remediation. 163 The DEP was responsible for monitoring this ef-
fort.' 64 The parties chose to mediate the development of a multi-site
remediation plan that would allow both company and agency to fulfill
their legal responsibilities swiftly and economically. 165
Ultimately, the parties developed a technical model for identify-
ing, prioritizing, and remediating sites, and a point system which ena-
bled the parties to evaluate PP&L's progress each year.166 In
addition, they agreed to a spending cap, assuring PP&L that it would
not be required to spend in excess of five million a year. 67 Although
the ultimate goal of cleaning up the sites was predetermined, the par-
ties discussed and reached an agreement on applicable technology,
timing, and logistics. Environmental regulations defined the negotiat-
ing space within which PP&L was able to maneuver. 168 However, us-
ing a norm-advocating model, the mediator was able to spark
innovative and creative problem-solving on implementation issues
which the regulations did not address.
tively. The groups directly involved should feel their interests have been served, and the
community-at-large should feel that a good precedent has been set (i.e., one that is consis-
tent with prevailing notions of fairness).") (emphasis in original); Susan Carpenter, Dealing
with Environmental and Other Complex Public Disputes, in COMMuNIrrY MEDIATION: A
HANDBOOK FOR PRACrITIONERS AND RESEARCHERS (Karen G. Duffy et al. eds., 1991).
160. See generally Richard M. Thornburgh et al., MULTI-SITE AGREEMENTS: MANAG-
ING ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILrrms THROUGH MEDIATION (1996) (unpublished draft on file
with author).
161. Id. at 2.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2, 11.
165. Id. at 2.
166. See id. at 7-8.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 10-11 (noting that DEP goals include "insur[ing] compliance with the appro-
priate environmental statutes and standards").
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The conflict resolution structures set up to handle disputes arising
under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)169 simi-
larly contemplate a norm-advocating process utilizing mediative tech-
niques. Complaints filed under Chapter Twenty 70 regarding
interpretation or application of NAFTA171 proceed through three
steps. First, the participating governments (Parties) consult on their
own concerning the alleged violation or misinterpretation of
NAFTA.172 If this is unsuccessful, the Free Trade Commission, con-
sisting of cabinet-level representatives of the parties, attempts to me-
diate the dispute.173 Finally, the Commission may convene an arbitral
panel to render a recommendation. 174
In its efforts to facilitate a voluntary resolution prior to impanel-
ing an arbitral board, the Commission is authorized to call on
technical advisers, create expert working groups, or "make recom-
mendations, as may assist the consulting Parties to reach a mutually
satisfactory resolution of the dispute."'175 Thus, Chapter Twenty medi-
ations will consist, in part, of Commission members calling upon legal
or trade experts to explicate the norms embodied in the 200 page
NAFTA text and making recommendations to the Parties as to how
they may modify their behavior so as to comply with those norms. 76
NAFTA also contains side agreements that establish separate dis-
pute resolution procedures for environmental, health, and labor dis-
putes. 77 The Environmental and Labor Accord procedures go into
effect when one Party alleges a "persistent pattern of failure" by an-
other Party to "effectively enforce" its environmental, labor, or health
169. North American Free Trade Agreement, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289
[hereinafter NAFTA].
170. Id. at 693-99 (citing arts. 2001-2022).
171. Chapter TWenty Proceedings are also triggered when "a Party considers that an
actual or proposed measure of another Party is or would be inconsistent with the obliga-
tions of this Agreement .... ." See id. at 694 (citing art. 2004).
172. Id. (citing art. 2006).
173. Id. at 695 (citing art. 2007).
174. Id. (citing art. 2008).
175. Id. (citing art. 2007(5)).
176. See David S. Huntington, Settling Disputes Under the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 34 HARV. INT'L L. 407, 418-19 (1993) (arguing that NAFTA's placement of
mediation within the rubric of the Free Trade Commission will likely result in "stricter
adherence to the agreement's legal norms").
177. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 1993, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., 32 I.LM. 1480 [hereinafter Environmental Accord]; North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter Labor Accord].
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laws.178 The Complaint activates a four-step process, overseen by su-
pranational commissions comprised of cabinet-level ministers from
each Party:179 the Commission for Environmental Cooperation han-
dles environmental disputes, while the Commission for Labor Cooper-
ation handles labor/health disputes.180 As in Chapter Twenty
disputes, consultation between the parties is the first step,181 followed
by mediation by the relevant Commission,'82 then arbitration by a
panel, 83 and finally, if the panel report is not accepted by the violat-
ing Party, sanctions.'84 Significantly, even after the arbitration panel
issues its report, the Accords allow for mediation among the disputing
parties of an action plan which "normally shall conform with the de-
terminations and recommendations of the panel.' 85
The Commissions charged with mediating environmental and la-
bor complaints are, like the Free Trade Commission, authorized to
include experts in the mediation process, if helpful. 8 6 Indeed, under
the Labor Side Agreement, an Evaluation Committee of Experts
(ECE) may be established to analyze patterns in the enforcement of
the health or labor standards at issue. The ECE reports its findings to
the Commission for Labor Cooperation, and, with the benefit of the
ECE report, the Commission is once again provided an opportunity to
mediate with the Parties in an effort to avoid an arbitrated solution.
The NAFTA Side Agreements create an informal, flexible dis-
pute resolution process that nonetheless works to bolster and uphold
the domestic environmental and labor standards of each member
Party. By weaving consultation, mediation, and arbitration functions
together in a multi-step process, the Side Agreements give voice to
178. See Environmental Accord, supra note 177, at 1490 (citing art. 22 (1)); Labor Ac-
cord, supra note 177, at 1509 (citing art. 27(1)).
179. See Environmental Accord, supra note 177, at 1485-89 (citing arts. 8-19); Labor
Accord, supra note 177, at 1504-07 (citing arts. 8-19).
180. Environmental Accord, supra note 177, at 1485-89 (citing arts. 8-19); Labor Ac-
cord, supra note 177, at 1504-07 (citing arts. 8-19).
181. Environmental Accord, supra note 177, at 1490 (citing art. 22); Labor Accord,
supra note 177, at 1509 (citing art. 27).
182. Environmental Accord, supra note 177, at 1490 (citing art. 23); Labor Accord,
supra note 177, at 1509 (citing art. 28).
183. Environmental Accord, supra note 177, at 1490-91 (citing art. 24); Labor Accord,
supra note 177, at 1509-10 (citing art. 29).
184. Environmental Accord, supra note 177, at 1493-94 (citing art. 36); Labor Accord
supra note 177, at 1512-13 (citing art. 41).
185. Environmental Accord supra note 177, at 1492 (citing art. 33); Labor Accord,
supra note 177, at 1511 (citing art. 38).
186. Environmental Accord, supra note 177, at 1490 (citing art. 23); Labor Accord,
supra note 177, at 1509 (citing art. 28).
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the quality of life concerns embodied in environmental and labor re-
strictions while providing the Parties a measure of political flexibil-
ity.187 The consultation and mediation steps are designed to allow the
complained-against Party room to respond to allegations of noncom-
pliance with domestic law, and to collaborate with trading partners in
fashioning a mutually satisfactory remedy. However, the mediation
process envisioned by the Side Agreements is clearly a norm-based
one.188 The designated third party neutrals-the Labor and Environ-
mental Commissions-are directed to call upon both technical and
legal experts to assist with mediation efforts. The Parties are also di-
rected to mediate the creation of a remedial "action plan" following
an arbitration ruling that domestic labor or environmental violations
have occurred. The mediation process in NAFTA takes as its starting
point the domestic regulatory structure of each Party and works solely
within the interstices of that framework.189
In like fashion, mediation of disability or discrimination claims
under the auspices of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) or the Department of Justice (DOJ) begins with the
statutory mandate. In these mediations, the parties have an opportu-
nity to articulate their needs and interests. However, these personal
norms are effectuated only to the degree that they align with the statu-
tory norms that the EEOC and DOJ are charged with enforcing.
In 1994, the EEOC, faced with a staggering backload of cases, 190
initiated a pilot mediation program to handle employee discrimination
187. See Jack I. Garvey, Trade Law and Quality of Life-Dispute Resolution Under the
NAFTA Side Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 439, 444 (1995)
(arguing that the central feature of the NAFTA Side Agreements is its allowance for polit-
ical adjustment. "The respondent is encouraged at every stage to improve its enforcement
of environmental, health and labor standards, without having to appear to be responding
to threats from the other governments.").
188. Id. at 446-48 (stressing that while the ad hoc nature of the arbitral panels allows
the United States to exert some economic leverage, reliance on post-negotiating bargaining
power is curtailed to the degree the "dispute resolution procedure operates according to
objective norms...").
189. Unfortunately, NAFTA's dispute resolution structure only addresses difficulties
created by one country's failure to abide by its own internal laws. It does not address
problems created by the discrepancies between the environmental and labor standards of
each Party. See Sam Howe Verhovek, A Diplomatic Haze Pervades Park's Air Pollution
Dispute, N.Y. TIMEs, June 7, 1996, at 1 (discussing air pollution created by coal-firing elec-
tricity plants that destroy views in Big Bend National Park. The plants meet Mexican
environmental standards for emission of sulfur dioxide, but the Mexican emission stan-
dards are seven times less stringent than those of the United States.).
190. See Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 30 GA. L.
REv. 431, 442 (1996).
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claims.'91 Following that effort, the EEOC convened an ADR Task
Force to study the applicability of ADR techniques to EEOC func-
tions. The Task Force endorsed "an ADR system built on principles
of fairness and protection of statutory rights."' 92 The Commission ap-
proved the Task Force recommendation and voted to incorporate al-
ternative dispute resolution into its charge-processing system.193
Although the EEOC has embraced mediation with vigor and enthusi-
asm,194 spokespersons stress that the Commission's evolving media-
tion initiative is not merely a device to speed the agency's handling of
cases. Rather, the initiative is part and parcel of the Commission's
"mission to vigorously enforce federal anti-discrimination law."' 95 As
ADR Task Force head Ricky Silberman explained, "First and fore-
most, the program must be fair, fair to the charging-party, fair to the
respondent. To ensure fairness, all parties must be informed about
their rights and responsibilities under the applicable statutes and
about the mechanics of the ADR program, its potential benefits and
drawbacks.' 96 Given the EEOC's stated mission and objectives, it
cannot adopt a mediation model which would leave to employees and
employers the task of determining what disparate treatment means
and what forms of discrimination will and will not be tolerated.
Rather, mediation conducted by the EEOC seeks settlements which
vindicate statutory norms.197
191. EEOC Pilot Suggests Mediation is Speedier Than a Typical Investigation by the
Agency, 13 ALTERNATrVES TO HIGH Cosr LrrG. 94 (1995). The EEOC contracted with
the Center for Dispute Settlement to mediate cases referred by the Commission.
Mediators from the Center for Dispute Settlement mediated 267 cases between April 1993
and February 1994. Settlement was reached in 52% of the mediated cases. When sur-
veyed, 92% of the parties believed the process was fair. More than 80% said they would
try mediation again. See Hodges, supra note 190, at 446-47.
192. News Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Apr. 28, 1995,
at 2 (on file with author).
193. Id. at 1.
194. Congress's delay in reauthorizing the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
slowed development of the EEOC's ADR program. Since reauthorization, however, the
District offices of the EEOC have continued implementing and expanding their program.
Telephone Interview with Office of Communications, EEOC Headquarters (July 3, 1996);
see also EEOC Mediation Program Set to Begin, 7 WoRLD ARB. MEDITION REP. 259
(Nov. 1996) (describing EEOC mediation program using law students and professional
mediators to handle employment disputes).
195. News Release, supra note 192, at 2.
196. ADR Task Force Presentation, 4 EMPL. DISCRMUNATION REP (BNA) No. 17, at
554 (May 10, 1995).
197. See Hodges, supra note 190, at 486 n.301 ("Where mediation is occurring pursuant
to a referral from the enforcement agency, the mediated agreements should be reviewed
by the agency for consistency with the statute. Therefore, the mediator must be sufficiently
knowledgeable to ensure such consistency.").
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The Department of Justice, which, like the EEOC, has enforce-
ment responsibility for several pieces of anti-discrimination legisla-
tion, has begun to use mediation to expedite processing of cases
arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).198 The De-
partment of Justice has awarded two grants to train mediators in the
processing of ADA claims.199 In both of these programs, the
mediators are educated about the substantive provisions of the Act to
ensure that they are equipped to analyze party suggestions in light of
the parties' legal rights.200 As one mediator explained, "ADA media-
tions are 'rights-based' rather than 'interest-based,' which means that
applicable law determines parameters of an equitable settlement,
rather than a settlement being determined solely by the declared in-
terest of the parties."20' The parties to ADA mediations negotiate
198. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990). The ADA prohibits
discrimination against individuals with disabilities by employers, state and local govern-
ments, and in public accommodations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993). See e.g.,
Administrative Conference Votes to Adopt ADR Recommendation for ADA, 27 PENS. &
BENEFTFrS REP. (BNA) No. 26 at 1516 (June 26, 1995) (stating that the Administrative
Conference of the United States recommends that the agencies charged with enforcing the
Americans with Disabilities Act should collaborate in designing mediation program).
199. See Amy Hermanek, Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act: Implementa-
tion of Mediation Programs for More Effective Use of the Act 12 LAW & INEo. J. 457
(1994). The Justice Department funded a training project implemented by the Community
Board Program in San Francisco in which mediators in San Francisco, Chicago, Denver,
Boston, and Atlanta were trained to mediate ADA cases. See TARGETING DisABILrrY
NEEDS: A GUIDE TO THE AMERICANS Wvm DIsABILmEs Acr FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROGRAMS, at 42 (1994) (on file with author); ANN HODGES, DISPUTE RESOLUTION
UNDER THE AmEmiCANS WrrH DIsABILIIES AcT 22 (1995). In addition, the Department
has funded the Key Bridge Foundation to train and establish a network of mediators avail-
able to mediate ADA claims. See Hodges, supra note 190, at 446; KEY BRIDGE FOUNDA-
TION, ADA-MEDIATION WORKSHOP: SELECTING, TRAINING, AND MONITORING
PROFESSIONAL MEDIATORS FOR ADA CoMPLAiNT REFERRAL (no date) (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter KEY BRIDGE TRAINING MANUAL].
200. See HODGES, supra note 199, at 60-61; KEY BRIDGE TRAINING MANUAL, supra
note 199, at 28 ("Mediators have standards of practice that mandate bringing the highest
level of expertise to the resolution of any dispute. Mediators who do not understand the
ADA should not be resolving ADA complaints."); Lynn R. Anders, Settling ADA Disputes
Through Mediation, CONN. L. TRIBUNE, Aug. 8, 1994, at 21 (stating that all volunteer
mediators receive 15 hours advanced training for mediating disability-discrimination
cases); Hodges, supra note 190, at 486-87.
201. Anders, supra note 200, at 21. It should be noted however that other mediators
who handle disability disputes would likely characterize ADA mediations as both rights
and interest-based. Indeed, in the Key Bridge Mediation training which this author at-
tended on March 9, 1997, it was clear that the trainers intended mediators to attend to both
the parties' rights and interests. Indeed, when Peter Maida, trainer and principal at Key
Bridge, modeled for the trainees how he would conduct a disability mediation, he avoided
discussion of the statute, focusing primarily on the parties' interests. Nevertheless, Mr.
Maida made clear in the training that mediators should avoid concurring in mediation out-
comes which contravene the express language and intent of the ADA.
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over what the statutory mandate to "reasonably accommodate" and
take "reasonably achievable" measures requires, given the claimant's
particular handicap and the respondent's particular business situa-
tion. 202 In framing a solution, they will give content to the norms of
tolerance and inclusion embodied in the statute. However, they will
not be generating the operative norms themselves. Those norms are
supplied by the statute.20 3
C. Identifying Paradigm Case(s) for Use of the Norm-Advocating Model
To some, norm-advocating mediation is a contradiction in
terms.2 4 Yet, its growing use is undeniable. One explanation for this
growth is that some disputes will be best resolved through a process
which combines the informality of mediation with the reliance on
legal and social norms characteristic of adjudication. These disputes
often involve interconnected issues, ongoing relationships, and highly-
charged disputant emotions. For these reasons, mediation's informal,
communication-oriented approach offers clear benefits. 205 However,
these conflicts are ill-suited to a norm-generating or even norm-edu-
cating approach for one of two reasons. First, the conflict implicates
important societal concerns, extending far beyond the parties' individ-
ual interests. 206 Second, the conflict only involves the interests of the
202. The ADA requires that employers make "reasonable accommodations" to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified applicant or employee. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(9), 12112(b)(5)(A), 12113(a)(Supp. 1996). The ADA further requires
public accommodations to remove architectural and communication barriers where such
removal is "readily achievable." See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(9), 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
203. "[M]ediation negotiations will not determine whether the law applies or what are
the respective legal rights and obligations; rather, negotiations will focus on how to achieve
compliance with applicable law, based on the needs of the individual with the disability and
the resources of the business, governmental entity or employer." Anders, supra note 200,
at 21. See also HODGEs, supra note 199, at 60 ("While the mediator is not a legal advisor to
the parties, the mediator must be aware of the legal context in which the dispute arises and
the standards that would be applicable if the case were to be litigated.").
204. See Kimberly K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation Is an Oxymo-
ron, 14 ALTERNATrvEs TO HIGH CosT oF LmG. 31 (1996).
205. See DUBLER & MARcUs, supra note 147. Throughout their text, Dubler and Mar-
cus point to the volatile, multi-layered, and highly charged nature of bioethical conflict,
and to the fact that the conflict often ensnares family members, and colleagues who must
work together in the most stressful of conditions. Mediation, as opposed to a medical
consult or legal hearing, "provides the opportunity for staff, patients, and family members
to vent their fears, articulate their concerns, and share their sorrows, all pieces of a princi-
pled resolution." Id. at 43.
206. See Hoffmann, supra note 75, at 870 (expressing concern that norm-generating
mediation may result in "a patient or family member ceding legal rights to a health care
provider or institution.... lead[ing] to a violation of state laws and policy as well as consti-
tutional principles") (emphasis omitted).
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parties, but one party is so structurally disenfranchised that allowing
her to negotiate away legal rights and entitlements would make the
mediator complicit in her continued oppression.20 7
The bioethics conflict described earlier was well-suited to norm-
advocating mediation because it both implicated important societal
concerns and involved a vulnerable disputant, Jennifer. The bioethics
controversy which arose around Jennifer's refusal of treatment raised
profound questions about how the values of autonomy and benefi-
cence are to be balanced in the treatment of seriously ill patients. Is
Jennifer competent or capable of refusing treatment? How is such an
assessment to be made? Even if held to be competent, should a com-
petent patient be able to refuse care when such refusal means death?
The legal and ethical conclusions reached reflect a societal con-
sensus that individual autonomy and dignity are supreme values which
require full and unfettered expression.208 Thus, a strong legal and eth-
ical consensus exists that a competent patient's wishes must be
respected.20 9 Further, the competency standard adopted by courts
and ethicists, which requires only that patients be able to understand
and weigh relevant information, not that they come to a "medically
rational" decision, reflects a desire to effectuate patient decisions
which reflect long-standing personal beliefs and commitments.210 By
informing the parties of these norms and urging their incorporation in
the decision-making process, the mediator reinforces significant social
values and protects a disputant who has little power at the mediation
table-the patient.211
207. See generally Hoffmann, supra note 75 (cautioning against the use of norm-gener-
ating, and implicitly norm-educating, mediation to resolve disputes over the provision of
life sustaining treatment because such a process does not adequately protect the patient);
see ag., DLBLER & MARCUS, supra note 147, at 41 (noting that in bioethics mediations,
where party negotiations converge on a resolution that would violate the patient's integ-
rity, the mediator is forced to "trump" the agreed-upon solution).
208. While communitarians challenge the weight that is accorded autonomy in liberal
theory, respect for the individual will remain a dominant value, both in ethical theory gen-
erally and in bioethics. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIoMEDICAL ETmIcs 58-60, 69-92 (4th ed. 1994).
209. See, e.g., H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOuNDAIONs OF BlomIcs 303
(2d ed. 1996) ("The fact that some individuals' choices are for others troublesome, bizarre
and tragic does not of itself mean that one may use force to stop them.").
210. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1241 (N.J. 1985) ("A patient may be incompe-
tent because he lacks the ability to understand the information conveyed, to evaluate the
options, or to communicate a decision."); 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMsSION FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAvioRAL RESEARCH, MAK-
ING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 57-60 (1982)[hereinafter 1 PRESIDENT'S COMmiSSION].
211. See DUELER & MARCUS, supra note 147, at iii, 2 (stressing that the mediator must
be knowledgeable about the legal and ethical principles and rules that form the basis for
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In environmental disputes, public resources-air, water, fragile
ecosystems, endangered species-are often at stake. Legal rules exist
to protect these public goods. Where the rules are clear and require
specific action, they should be articulated and enforced-no less in
mediation than in a court of law. The same may be said in disputes
involving discrimination claims or other legally circumscribed activity.
What the legal, ethical, or social norm requires in each case, how-
ever, is often a matter for much discussion. While ethical norms may
dictate that life-support decisions be made in the "best interests" of
the patient, family and medical staff may differ on what exactly the
patient's interests are. The Environmental Protection Agency regula-
tions may require the clean up of PCB contaminated sites, but the
timeline and mechanics of the cleanup may be a proper subject of
negotiation. The Americans with Disabilities Act may require an em-
ployer to "reasonably accommodate" a disabled employee, but the ac-
commodation could conceivably take different forms, depending on
what the parties want.
Where the norm to be applied is sufficiently open-textured that it
permits several equally acceptable outcomes, then the mediation shifts
to a norm-generating mode. Within the open boundaries that the
norm establishes, the parties are free to bring their own interests, con-
cerns, and creative thinking to bear on the problem. Thus, the differ-
ences between norm-advocating and norm-generating mediation are
not as dramatic as might be originally imagined. The differences may
be framed in high relief where the norms to be applied are precise and
dictate the parties follow a particular action plan. The differences
fade, however, in disputes where the norms to be applied are indeter-
minate, leaving the parties free to decide precisely how and in what
manner those norms will be given content and effect.
The norm-advocating model, then, is applicable in disputes which
require application of a normative framework, but present gray areas
within that framework for negotiation. It may be argued that a pro-
cess that limits the options available to the parties to those congruent
with pre-existing norms is too constrictive to be called mediation.
However, considerable negotiation may take place in the open space
which normative guidelines leave uncertain. If the mediator uses me-
diative techniques to help the parties reach agreement within those
bioethical analysis in order to promote good patient care and ease the suffering often ex-
perienced by caregivers, family, and loved ones).
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regions, that process should be regarded as mediation. To call it
something else spawns needless confusion.
IV. Why Recognition of the Three Models-and the
Divergent Role Social Norms Play in Each-Matters
As the preceding sections demonstrate, many individual practi-
tioners and institutions utilize either the norm-educating, or norm-ad-
vocating models, or some combination. Indeed, in delineating these
three models, I do not mean to suggest that they are always, or even
usually, used singly. Rather, many mediators will combine these vari-
ous models, depending on the nature of the dispute. A divorce media-
tor, for example, may employ a norm-educating model when
discussing spousal support and property division. She may shift to a
norm-advocating model if the parents contemplate a visitation plan
that would place the child at risk. And, she may adhere to a norm-
generating model when assisting the parties in how property of only
sentimental value should be divided.212
Despite the prevalence of the norm-educating and advocating
models, academic commentators and practitioners alike tend to con-
ceive of the norm-generating model as the authentic article and recog-
nize the more norm-based procedures, if at all, as aberrant step-
children. Both Professor James Alfini, in describing "evaluative" me-
diation, and Professors Craig McEwen, Nancy Rogers, and Richard
Maiman, in depicting Maine's lawyer-dominated divorce mediation
program, question whether these procedures represent "real media-
tion. '213 Scholars and mediators Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph
P. Folger recognize two distinct mediator orientations which they la-
bel transformative and problem-solving. 21 4 Both of these approaches,
however, are based on the norm-generating model.215 Bush and Fol-
212. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 107.
213. See James Alfini & Gerald S. Clay, Should Lawyer-Mediators be Prohibited from
Providing Legal Advice or Evaluations?, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1994, at 8; McEwen,
supra note 108, at 1392, 1394 (suggesting that while divorce mediation traditionalists may
view Maine's mediation as facilitated pretrial settlement conferences rather than "real"
mediation, "[l]awmakers should discard traditional mediation, even if it seems more 'real'
or satisfying to the mediator, if it fails to serve the families' needs or ensure fairness").
214. See generally BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 17.
215. Both the transformative and problem-solving styles envision a process in which
party settlements derive solely from party norms. The transformative approach seeks to
improve a disputant's moral sensibility through empowerment and cultivation of em-
pathetic response. Id. at 81-89. The problem-solving approach aims to "find solutions that
meet the needs of all involved parties to the greatest possible degree, and thus maximize
joint satisfaction." Id. at 56. Both the problem-solving and transformative methods fit
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ger's 284-page tome on the "promise of mediation" nowhere mentions
social norms and their possible place in mediation practice.
In When Talk Works, researchers identified a persistent media-
tion mythology in which all mediation follows the norm-generating
model. According to this mythology, mediators are passive actors,
completely neutral with regard to the proposed outcome of the dis-
pute, and unwilling to use social norms to constrain the disputants'
settlement autonomy.216 Although the actual practice of the profiled
mediators departed sharply from this theoretical ideal,217  the
mediators nonetheless continued to adhere to the myths as formal vir-
tues. 218 Although the mediators were aware that many of their behav-
iors undercut and exposed the cleavage between myth and reality, this
disjunction did not prompt them to question the myth's validity.21 9
This may be, as the researchers suggest, because the "mythic
'frame' ... gives direction and inspiration amidst uncertainty, isola-
tion, and complexity. '220 A concomitant explanation is simply that
the norm-generating model, inspired by a communitarian vision of au-
tonomous, self-actualizing individuals realizing mutual gains while
rediscovering community norms, presents an attractive vision. While
the vision may not bear a close resemblance to much that transpires in
real life, it continues to command strong ideological allegiance.
within the norm-generating paradigm in limiting the scope of inquiry and discussion to the
parties' own articulated norms. See FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 7-15.
216. See WBmN TALK WoRms: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS, supra note 19, at 459-60,479-
80 ("The mythic world of mediation is one in which one practitioner of the art is pretty
much like another in regard to motives and orientation to the role. In the mythic world,
mediators are impartial neutrals who have no authority and no wish to impose their views
on the disputing parties.... Most of the mediators bow in the direction of the voluntari-
ness of the mediation process and the need to respect the parties' autonomy. This is part of
the myth of mediation. Yet nearly every profile illustrates the working mediator attempt-
ing to shape the process and substance using some very strenuous and powerful tactics.").
217. Id. at 473 (describing settlement-oriented mediators who educate the parties
about the social norms that would shape their dispute in another forum).
These settlement-oriented mediators are quite willing to acknowledge that they
make judgments about what is a good and bad agreement and try to influence the
parties in the direction of good. Theirs is an activist view of the mediation role,
and they are eager to campaign to persuade or motivate the parties to concur.
They thrust themselves forcefully into the conflict and are strongly inclined to
believe that without their substantive and procedural know-how, the parties
would flounder and settlement would be elusive.
Id. at 473-74.




But, clinging to obsolete phantasms that no longer capture a dy-
namic reality poses numerous dangers for a burgeoning profession. 1
Here, I will focus on two tasks greatly hindered by the lack of an ade-
quate theory. The first is the establishment and implementation of
training and qualification standards for practitioners. The second is
the creation of clear and consistent ethics codes.
A. Taining and Evaluating: When Diversity Becomes Disarray
One of the hallmarks of "professional status" lies in the creation
of performance standards and a regulatory system designed to ensure
that they are met. Most professions require aspirants to matriculate
from accredited educational institutions and pass standardized ex-
ams.222 These achievements are accepted proof (or at least compel-
ling evidence) that the student-cum-professional has acquired and
demonstrated the knowledge base and skills necessary for competent
practice.
In mediation, the question of what knowledge and skills qualify a
mediator for professional practice remains open-ended. The various
mediation courses offered throughout the country may contain over-
lapping material. However, this coincidence is serendipitous. No uni-
form core curriculum exists,223 nor does a standardized method of
presenting information, teaching skills, or evaluating progress. 224
221. "In the press to professionalize the work, these myths become the bases for selec-
tion and training of new mediators and so are perpetuated in the ongoing practice. With-
out examining the myths, the risks of demoralized practitioners, oversold or misleading
claims, and a general intellectual and professional stagnation are likely."
Id. at 490 (citation omitted).
222. For example, attorneys must sit for and pass a state bar exam accepted in the
jurisdiction where they will practice; physicians must receive a passing score on the stan-
dardized medical boards before being permitted to practice medicine.
223. See Joseph B. Stulberg, Training Intervenors for ADR Processes, 81 Ky. 1-1. 977
(1992-93).
224. Id. at 1006 ("The methods for ensuring competent trainee performance vary
widely .... No standardized check list or pivot points exist to help provide uniform and
consistent feedback among various trainers to each participant."). Little empirical explo-
ration has been done to determine what sort of training produces skilled and successful
mediators. The scant data that does exist suggests that training is only indirectly related to
mediator settlement rates, and the type of training received does not appear to have a
significant impact. See Margaret L. Shaw, Mediator Qualifications: Report of a Symposium
on Critical Issues in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 109, 160
(1988) (citing study undertaken in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in Ohio
involving mediators, parties, and attorneys in 460 cases).
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The prerequisites for participation in the numerous state and fed-
eral court-annexed mediation programs in existence225 reveal a com-
plete lack of consensus on what training, experience, or academic
background best prepares an individual to mediate. Review of a sam-
pling of these court mediation rules illustrates their heterogeneity.
Some courts require that mediators have a law degree, 2 6 others
do not. 2 7 Individuals seeking to mediate in the Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Oregon must possess a license either as an attorney,
accountant, real estate broker, appraiser, engineer, or other profes-
sional.3 Oklahoma's Dispute Resolution Act, which authorizes local
state courts to refer to mediation criminal misdemeanors, housing,
employment, debtor-credit disputes as well as cases ordinarily sent to
small claims, imposes no professional degree or license
requirement.229
Among jurisdictions that rely exclusively on lawyers, the amount
of required legal experience varies. The District Court for the Eastern
District of Washington State, for example, requires that mediators of
court-referred cases be attorneys, admitted to law practice in a state
court for five years, and a member of the bar of the Washington Dis-
trict Courts3Po The District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania certifies lawyers to mediate who have been a member of a
state bar for fifteen years3 31
Requirements for training in mediation range from the nonexis-
tent, to attendance at a mediation course spanning several dozen
hours. Washington's Western District Court program requires no me-
225. Virtually all Federal District Courts have responded to the Civil Justice and Re-
form Act's injunction to implement expense and delay reduction plans. See 28 U.S.C.A.
§§ 471-482 (West 1993); ELzABEm PLAPINGER AND DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AM SET-
'_.MmENT IN TE FEDERAL Disnucr COURTS 3 (1996). Of these, fifty-one district courts
have established mediation programs. Id. at 4, 17. Additionally each state has introduced
mediation to the judicial system in some form. See ERIc GALToN, REPRESENTING CLIENTS
IN MEDIATION, apps. D, E (1994); Catherine Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming: Systematizing
Corporate Use of ADR, 59 ALB. L. REv. 847, 871-72 (1996).
226. U.S. DIST. CT., E. DIsr. PA., LOC. R. Civ. P. 53.2.1(b); U.S. DIST. Or., E. DIST.
TENN., Loc. R. 16.4(k); U.S. DIST. Or., E. DIST WASH., Loc. R. 16.2(b)(2).
227. IN. ADR R. 2.5; LA PARISH OF ORLEANS, Civ. DIST. Or. R 18 § 3; N.C. SUPER.
CT. MEDIATED SErri. ENT CONF. R. 8(B)(2); NJ. Or. R. 1:40-10(a)2.1(a); Omo SuMMrT
CoUNry Cr. R. 22.04 (1996-1997); OKLA. RULES & PROC. FOR THE Disp. RESOL. Acr, R.
11(A) (West 1996); TEX. Crv. PRAC. AND REm. CODE ANN. § 154.052 (Vernon Supp.
1997).
228. U.S. BANR. Cr., DIST. OR., Loc. R. MEDIATION 9019-2B(1)(a)(1).
229. OKLA. R. AND PROC. R 11(A).
230. U.S. Disr. Or., E. DIsr. WASH., LOC. R. 16(2)(b)(2)(a)-(b).
231. U.S. DIST. Cr., E. Disr. PA., Loc. R. 53.2.1(b).
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diation training;232 Ohio's Summit County Court of Common Pleas
requires six hours;233 Louisiana's Parish of Orleans originally required
sixteen and now requires thirty-two;234 and Florida's circuit court de-
mands forty.235
The specification of training content varies widely as well. Indi-
viduals wishing to mediate under the Oklahoma Dispute Resolution
Act must obtain training which covers a particular set of topics. 236
These include: instruction and practice in the introduction to media-
tion, calming techniques, listening skills, negotiations, holding private
meetings within mediation, working toward an agreement, and speci-
fying terms in an agreement.237 North Carolina's Superior Court pro-
gram requires nonattorneys to attend six hours of training on North
Carolina legal terminology and civil court procedure, mediator ethics
and confidentiality, and to participate in twenty hours of basic media-
tion training.238 A California certification bill recently defeated in
committee would have required certified mediators to receive educa-
tion in "the distinction between ... directive and facilitative pro-
cess[es] ... [u]nderstanding power imbalances, confronting unrealistic
expectations, being an effective agent of reality, making responsible
evaluations, abstaining from giving legal advice, ensuring informed
consent, maintaining standards of fairness and impartiality, and the
importance of confidentiality."'239 In contradistinction to these pre-
cisely elaborated training requirements, many court programs simply
require some hour amount of generic training without detailing the
content or nature of the training.24o
232. U.S. DIST. Or., W. DIST. WASH., Loc. R. 39.1(b).
233. OHo SuMMIrr COUNTY Or. R. 22.04(a).
234. LA. PARISH OF ORLEANS, Civ. DisT. CT. R. 18 § 3.
235. See FLA. R. FOR CERTIFIED AND CT. APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10.010(c)(1).
236. See OKLA. R. AND PROC. R. 11(c)(3).
237. ld. at R. 11(A)(2).
238. N.C. SUPER. CT. MEDIATED SETrLEMENT CoNF. R. 8B(2)(a), (c). Interestingly,
North Carolina attorneys need not obtain the additional training regarding ethics and con-
fidentiality. Attorneys are also exempt from the mediation experience requirements
placed on non-attorneys. Id. at B(1)(a)-(b). The North Carolina statute seems to assume
that an attorney or retired judge's prior legal experience will amply equip her for the rigors
of mediation.
239. CAL. S.B. 1428 § 2 (to have been codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4643 (1),
(E)).
240. See, e.g., U.S. BANKR. Cr., DIST. OR., Loc. R. MEDIATION 9019-2.B(a)(4)(a)
(mediators must have "completed a mediation training course qualifying for at least twelve
hours of Oregon State Bar continuing legal education credit"); U.S. DiST. CT., E. Disr.
TENN., Loc. R. 16.4(k) (all Mediators must have had formal training, including at least
twenty hours of formal Mediation training).
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The credentials and training required for participation in court-
referred custody and visitation programs are equally variable.241 No
one academic specialty or professional background serves as a precon-
dition to selection. Individuals may conduct family mediation in Flor-
ida if they are either an attorney, certified public accountant, a
psychiatrist licensed to practice either adult or child psychiatry, or
possess a Masters or Ph.D. in social work, mental health, or one of the
behavioral or social sciences.242 New Jersey mediators must hold a
graduate degree or certification of advanced training in one of the
behavioral or social sciences.243 Conversely, anyone with a bachelors
degree from an accredited institution can conduct family mediation in
Indiana.244 Michigan requires domestic relations mediators be attor-
neys with an active divorce practice,245 and Nebraska and Minnesota
courts dispense with degree requirements entirely.246
The knowledge base thought necessary to conduct family media-
tion varies as well from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Minnesota's list of
minimum qualifications includes knowledge of: "the court sys-
tem,.., procedures used in contested child custody matters, ... other
resources in the community to which the parties to contested child
custody matters can be referred for assistance,... child development,
clinical issues relating to children, the effects of marriage dissolution
on children, and child custody research." 247 Indiana considers posses-
sion of this knowledge preferable, but optional.248 In Illinois' eleventh
judicial circuit, mediators must receive specialized education in family
law, as well as child development and family relations.249 Georgia re-
quires that its divorce and child custody mediators receive special
241. See Jennifer A. Mastrofski, Mediation in Court-Based Systems: More Variations
than Similarities, 11 NEGOTIATION 1. 257, 262 (1990) (stating that in the six Pennsylvania
court-sponsored mediation programs studied, "where judges did not rely on bar sup-
port.... mediators were chosen according to unclear and unspecified criteria ... ").
242. See FLA. R. FOR CERTIFIED AND Cr. ApPOiNmD MEDIATORS 10.010(b)(2).
243. See N.J. R. 1:40-10(a)2.1(a).
244. IrD. ADR R. 2.5 (C)(1).
245. MicH. SPECIAL PRO. AND ACTIONS R. 3216(F)(1)(a)-(c).
246. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.619 (West Supp. 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2905
(1993).
247. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 518.619(4)(a)-(c).
248. Io. ADR R. 2.5(C)(2) ("To the extent practicable, mediators must have knowl-
edge of the Indiana judicial system, the procedures used in domestic relations cases, the
resources in the community to which the parties can be referred for assistance, child devel-
opment, clinical issues relating to children, the effects of dissolution of marriage on chil-
dren, and family systems theory.").
249. IL. Loc. R. l1TH CR., APP. D, SE C. 5(c)(1).
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training in domestic violence.250 Missouri requires a twenty hour child
custody training, but provides no further detail on its content.251
Whether the mediator must possess substantive knowledge about
the issues in dispute appears a particularly bedeviling question. Ed-
ward Hartfield has argued that, for mediators of public policy or envi-
ronmental disputes, too much subject matter knowledge can be a
dangerous thing.252 He maintains, "Where an individual has too much
knowledge about an industry or environmental subject, it may ad-
versely affect his openness to certain kinds of resolutions." 253 At the
same time, Hartfield notes that "[o]f course, every mediator wants to
be as informed as possible about the subject areas of the mediation. If
a mediator knows nothing about the subject area, then it will be diffi-
cult to assist the parties in an effective fashion." 254 The conclusion
would appear to be that some subject matter knowledge is important,
but too much could close the mediator's mind to innovative ideas.
Professor and mediator Margaret L. Shaw, summarizing a symposium
discussion of qualifications, observes that while "general knowledge"
of the subject matter of a dispute was considered useful in a number
of ways, the same conclusion cannot necessarily be drawn about tech-
nical expertise.2 5 However, the panel also concluded that technical
expertise may be relevant in particular cases where "the mediator will
be called upon to play a very assertive role which occurs when the
parties are either unusually hostile or passive. '25 6 Thus, according to
at least one group of commentators, general knowledge as opposed to
technical knowledge is necessary for artful mediation, but technical
knowledge may only be important when working with particularly
challenging disputants.257
Christopher Honeyman, a pioneer in the exploration of mediator
qualifications, published a set of performance-based standards that
250. GA. ALTERNATIVE Disp. RESOL. R., APP. B.
251. See Mo. S. Cr. R. OF SPECIAL ACTIONS 88.05 (a)(2).
252. See Edward F. Hartfield, Qualifications and Training Standards for Mediators of
Environmental and Public Policy Disputes, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 109 (1988)
253. Id. at 117.
254. Id.
255. Shaw, supra note 224, at 132-33.
256. Id. at 133.
257. Id. at 132-33. The panel noted that a mediator's grasp of subject matter informa-
tion is to be considered for its usefulness in helping the parties reach agreement, not for its
use in ensuring the fairness or viability of the resulting agreement. This suggests that the
panel was working primarily within a norm-generating model. Id. at 133.
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have proved highly influential.258 Although Honeyman included sub-
stantive knowledge among his seven parameters of effectiveness, 259 he
added the caveat that such substantive knowledge "is not established
as an essential part of a mediator's background .... There may well be
circumstances in which... a program would deliberately choose to
assign a complex dispute to a mediator lacking substantive knowledge
but known to be an effective investigator. '260 Several years later, a
group of prominent scholars and practitioners published the Interim
Guidelines for Selecting Mediators.261 These guidelines list mediator
tasks and competencies and establish a set of evaluation criteria that
can be used to assess a mediator's progress and proficiency. The
Guidelines' authors assumed that individual mediation programs
would place varying weight and emphasis on the substantive knowl-
edge component. Consequently, they omitted substantive knowledge
as a criteria for mediator selection.262 While noting that a new media-
tor needs enough knowledge of the type of dispute to "be able to facil-
itate communication; develop options; empathize; and alert
parties... to the existence of legal information relevant to their deci-
sion to settle,"263 they also state that "there is at least anecdotal evi-
dence that a mediator's substantive knowledge requirements are often
overestimated by the parties," and that in highly complex disputes, it
258. See Christopher Honeyman, On Evaluating Mediators, 6 NEGOTATION J. 23
(1990). For a report on how the standards, adapted slightly, fared as a diagnostic measure
of mediation competence, see Brad Honoroff et al., Putting Mediation Skills to the Test, 6
NEGOTIATION J. 37 (1990).
259. Honeyman, supra note 258, at 27-32. The seven parameters included investiga-
tion, defined as "effectiveness in identifying and seeking out relevant information pertinent
to the case"; empathy, defined as "conspicuous awareness and consideration of the needs
of others"; inventiveness and problem-solving, defined as "pursuit of collaborative solu-
tions and generation of ideas and proposals consistent with case facts and workable for
opposing parties"; persuasion and presentation skills, defined as "effectiveness of verbal
expression and 'body language' in communicating with parties"; distraction, defined as "ef-
fectiveness at reducing tensions at appropriate times by temporarily diverting parties' at-
tention"; managing the interaction, defined as "effectiveness in developing strategy,
managing the process, coping with conflicts between clients and professional representa-
tives"; and substantive knowledge, defined as "expertise in the issues and type of dispute."
Id.
260. Id. at 30.
261. INTERIM GUIDELINFS FOR SELEcriNG MEDIATORS (Nat'l Inst. of Dispute Resol.
ed., 1993).
262. Christopher Honeyman, A Consensus on Mediators' Qualifications, 9 NEGOTIA-
TION J. 295, 305-06 (1993).
263. Id. at 306.
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is enough if someone at the table, not necessarily the mediator, has
the necessary legal or technical expertise.2 4
These discussions suggest that the question of whether substan-
tive knowledge is necessary for a competent mediator can only be an-
swered by "it depends. '265 But this answer makes little sense
according to an omnibus theory of mediation that recognizes only the
norm-generating model. According to this theory, the mediator need
never possess any substantive knowledge surrounding the issues in
dispute; her role does not include providing information about or ad-
vocating inclusion of social norms.
Recognizing the existence of norm-based as well as norm-gener-
ating models explains why mediator familiarity with the issues in dis-
pute may sometimes be necessary. It clarifies that mediators using a
norm-generating model need process skills only; mediators using a
norm-educating or norm-advocating model, however, must have some
familiarity with the relevant social norms in order to employ those
models effectively. This insight has implications for programs at-
tempting to determine what sorts of academic or professional back-
ground and skills to require.266 Once a mediation program
determines which model or combination of models is best suited to its
mix of cases, then it can better fashion appropriate training and per-
formance standards.267
264. Il at 308 n.3. See also THE TEST DESIGN PROJECr, PERFORMANCE-BASED As-
sssMENT- A METHODOLOGY FOR USE IN SELEcIING, TRAINING, AND EVALUATING
MEDIATORS 25 (Nat'l Inst. of Dispute Resol. ed., 1995) (concluding that no universal
guidelines may be formulated specifying the importance of mediator knowledge of the
disputed issues).
265. See George H. Friedman & Allan D. Silberman, A Useful Tool for Evaluating
Potential Mediators, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 313, 314 (1993) ("The requirement for substantive
expertise varies with the dispute, the mediation program (e.g. court system or administra-
tive agency), and the parties' expectations and needs.").
266. For example, a mediation program designed to handle civil matters referred from
the court could self-consciously decide to adopt either a norm-generating or norm-educat-
ing model. If the program chose a norm-generating model, it could reasonably decide to
impose no professional or academic degree requirements, and require no legal or other
subject matter expertise. If the program decided to adopt a norm-educating model, it
might then seek a mediation roster of attorneys equipped to provide general legal informa-
tion about the referred disputes.
267. Recognizing the existence of norm-based approaches in addition to the norm-gen-
erating model is, of course, only the first step toward the development of clear professional
standards for mediators. Practitioners and program directors must next become sophisti-
cated in determining when specific models should be used.
Others have proposed a taxonomy for determining which cases should be litigated,
arbitrated, or mediated. See Bush, supra note 66; Sander & Goldberg, supra note 70. This
form of analysis should be extended to the subset of cases that are deemed suitable for
mediation. This paper briefly suggests certain considerations which may inform the choice
[Vol. 48
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL NORMS IN MEDIATION
B. Confusion in Ethical Standards and Codes
Over the last fifteen years, a number of professional associations
have promulgated ethical codes or guidelines for mediators. The
codes are purely advisory; violations are not investigated or punished.
However, they have an important effect on the industry, as they pur-
port to represent the "gold standard" in mediator conduct.
Unfortunately, in many cases, the codes create more ambiguity
than clarity. One set of standards flatly contradicts another,268 while a
number of codes are internally inconsistent.269 This is largely due to
the codes' failure to recognize the existence of different mediation
models. The codes contemplate one set of principles to be applied in
a uniform manner to all mediation. Unfortunately, each mediation
model places a different weight and emphasis on the values of fair-
ness, disputant autonomy, social justice, and self-determination. Pre-
dictably, the tensions, both within and among the ethical guidelines,
occur at the points where the ethical vectors in the three mediation
models begin to diverge. The competing ethical imperatives of each
model create unavoidable strains and inconsistencies.
The most obvious inconsistency in the codes lies in the simultane-
ous recommendation that mediators promote disputant autonomy
while ensuring that mediated agreements are fair according to societal
norms. The codes drafted by the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), American Bar Association (ABA), Society of Professionals
in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR), the Academy of Family Mediators
(AFM), and the Colorado Council of Mediation Organizations (Colo-
rado) all state that enhancing disputant self-determination is a pri-
mary goal of mediation.270 At the same time, these same standards
of mediation model. A more precise taxonomy identifying the types of cases best treated
by a norm-generating, norm-educating or norm-enforcing approach is needed.
268. See Leda M. Cooks & Claudia L. Hale, The Construction of Ethics in Mediation,
12 MEDIATION Q. 63 (1994) (contrasting codes developed by the Colorado Council of Me-
diation Organizations, the Academy of Family Mediators (AFM), and the American Bar
Association (ABA)).
269. See infra notes 270-280 and accompanying text.
270. See e.g., Colorado Council of Mediation Organizations Code of Professional Con-
duct (1982) reprinted in GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 70, at App. B, 476 ("The primary
responsibility for the resolution of a dispute rests on the parties themselves .... At no
time should a mediator coerce a party into agreement. The mediator should not attempt to
make a substantive decision for the parties."); ACADEMY OF FAMILY MEDIATORS, STAN-
DARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION Standard Nos. 1, 3 [hereinaf-
ter ACADEMY OF FAMILY MEDIATORS] (The primary responsibility for the resolution of a
dispute rests with the participants .... At no time shall a mediator coerce a participant into
agreement or make a substantive decision for any participant); Code adopted jointly by the
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, the American Arbitration Association, and
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exhort mediators to consider whether the mediation agreement they
are facilitating is "fair," both to the disputants and absent third par-
ties. For example, Standard I1I, Section D of the ABA Code states
that mediator impartiality does not preclude the mediator from assess-
ing the fairness of the agreement.271 Standard IV, Section A of the
AFM Code similarly requires mediators to be impartial "while raising
questions" of fairness and equity.272 The Colorado Code suggests a
range of mediator options if the parties reach an agreement that the
mediator feels is unfair, inequitable, or "not likely to hold."273 These
choices range from informing the disputants of the fairness concerns
to withdrawing as a mediator and revealing publicly the general rea-
son for taking such action.274 The Illinois Code simply suggests that
mediators "disassociate" themselves from agreements that "they per-
ceive to be so far outside the parameter of fairness that they do not
believe them to be fair and reasonable."275
Few codes provide explicit guidance as to how the mediator
should assess the fairness of the proposed mediated agreement. 276
The Illinois Code is the most direct, offering "case precedent, legal
requirements, and learned common sense to help us to evaluate fair-
ness. '277 Others are more elusive. Those codes that insist that dispu-
tants be provided access to relevant legal or technical data2 78
implicitly propose that the parties' knowledge of such data is relevant
in assessing the fairness of any resultant agreement.2 79
The codes, then, call upon mediators to assume blatantly contra-
dictory stances. On the one hand, they are to promote disputant au-
the American Bar Association (Joint Code), Standard No. 1 reprinted in KOVACH, supra
note 12, at 268 (self-determination is the fundamental principle of mediation).
271. See STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS, supra note 104, at 457.
272. See AcADEMY OF FAMILY MEDIATORS, supra note 270, at 2.
273. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 70, at 479-80.
274. Id.
275. Joan Dworkin & William London, What is a Fair Agreement, 7 MEDIATION Q. 3, 6
(1989) (quoting MEDIATION COUNCIL OF ILLINOIS, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS OF PRAC-
TICE FOR MEDIATORS, Section IV (1984)).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 70, at 472 (quoting Standard IV of the ABA
Code, which states that "[tihe mediator has a duty to assure that the mediation participants
make decisions based upon sufficient information and knowledge").
279. See Sarah C. Grebe, Ethics and the Professional Family Mediator, 10 MEDIATION
Q. 155, 161-62 (1992) (noting that both the AFM and ABA codes require the mediator to
advise disputants to obtain legal review from outside counsel, and arguing that "[t]he effect
of this emphasis is to moderate the already indirect support of autonomy and self-determi-
nation found in [the codes]").
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tonomy by enabling the disputants to decide for themselves how they
wish to resolve their disputes. Towards this end, mediators are to as-
siduously avoid making any substantive suggestions or otherwise co-
erce disputant decisionmaking. On the other hand, the mediator is
expected to challenge disputants when they are inclining towards
agreements that the mediator deems unfair, inequitable, unlikely to
hold, disadvantageous to the parties, disadvantageous to third parties,
or simply uninformed.280 The codes rhetorically proclaim allegiance
to disputant self-determination, while authorizing the mediator to
trump disputant judgments when the mediator considers them unfair
or unwise.
These contradictions create uncertainty in mediator practice. A
study analyzing ethical dilemmas in mediator practice highlighted the
frequency with which mediators report themselves torn between try-
ing to preserve self-determination and promote fairness.28 Com-
ments from a seminar devoted to ethical concerns in mediation
practice reflect further haziness.282 One seminar participant, a law
professor-mediator, claimed that in her practice, she respected the
parties' right to make their own decisions, while ensuring that those
decisions are "good ones," according to her own judgment.283
280. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 70, at 479-80; Program on Alternative Dispute
Resolution Standards for Private and Public Mediators in the State of Hawaii (1986), re-
printed in Margaret Shaw, Alternative Dispute Resolution: How to Use it to Your Advan-
tage, 976 AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE-AMERaCAN BAR ASSOCIATION 757, 779-80 (1994),
available in WL at C976 ALI-ABI Course of Study.
281. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH, THE DmEMMAs OF MEDIATION PRACTICE: A
STUDY OF ETHICAL DILEMMAS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, A REPORT ON A STUDY FOR
THE NATIONAL INSTrrUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1, 15 (1992). The study, conducted
in Florida, involved interviews with 80 mediators culled from the divorce, community, and
civil arenas. The mediators were asked to identify scenarios from their practice that they
considered ethically problematic. Id. at 6. Mediators reported being troubled by cases in
which they felt that the mandate to preserve disputant self-determination could only be
achieved by becoming a party to a "gross injustice." Id. at 15-18. More specifically,
mediators were likely to feel conflicted when the parties formulated a solution which the
mediator felt was: illegal; unfair because it violated fundamental rights; adverse to the
interest of an absent third party (especially children). Id.
282. Cooks & Hale, supra note 268.
283. Id. at 71. For this academician, the mediator who handled the landlord tenant
dispute which served as the focal point of the ethics discussion failed because he did not
support the tenant adequately.
[T]he mediator does nothing to empower her to make ... choices.... It seems to
me that the mediator could talk to her about her fears and options instead of
saying, "Well, you're not making the right choices and I'm not going to help you
make any choices because I don't want to tell you what to do." There's a differ-
ence in mediation between letting people do what they want and not letting them
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The effort to construct a code suitable for all manners of media-
tion fails because it does not recognize the divergent, and often com-
peting, dictates which issue from each model. Mediation is not a
"one-size-fits all" process; it cannot be guided by a "one-size-fits all"
code.
Replacing our existing theoretical lens with a multi-tiered prism
would allow for the construction of internally consistent codes, tai-
lored to fit each of the mediation models. The codes could straightfor-
wardly acknowledge that mediators cannot pay absolute deference to
party autonomy while ensuring that mediated agreements reflect soci-
etal norms and value judgments.
Rather, the codes could specify that mediators are to give greater
weight to disputant autonomy in the norm-generating model than in
the norm-educating or norm-advocating processes. Conversely, fair-
ness concerns and the safeguarding of third party interests should
loom larger in the mediator's consciousness when she is employing
more norm-based procedures. If both mediator and disputants are in
agreement regarding the particular mediative approach to be used, it
is unlikely that either value-fairness or autonomy-will be unduly
compromised.
Conclusion
As the ADR revolution continues, metamorphosis remains the
governing state of affairs. Although mediation observers concede that
the field is not standing still, recognition of these changes is inchoate.
Mediation theory remains oriented towards the traditional norm-gen-
erating process, ignoring much of what is actually practiced in the me-
diation "trenches."
This Article urges a reworking of mediation theory to enhance its
descriptive and normative functions.284 Others have noted that practi-
tioners veer between dichotomous styles. This article suggests we ap-
mess themselves up by doing that, and I try to come out in the middle by empow-
ering them to make good choices.
Id.
While this vision of empowerment makes sense within the norm-educating paradigm,
it contradicts the norm-generating assumption that parties know best what is in their own
interest and benefit most when they are supported in making their own decisions.
284. See Peter J. Carnevale, The Usefulness of Mediation Theory, 8 NEGOTIATION J.
387, 389-90 (1992) ("If usefulness of mediation theory is in the eye of the user, then per-
haps the greatest value of general mediation theory is the possibility that it will improve
the user's vision. Models of mediation may help us see aspects of particular situations that
we might otherwise have missed.").
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proach these variations by examining the mediator's relationship to,
and use (or disuse) of social norms. It describes and presents exam-
ples of three separate mediation models-norm-generating, norm-ed-
ucating, and norm-advocating-and suggests that each of these
models may be profitably employed in different dispute contexts. Dis-
entangling various mediation modalities according to this scheme will
help explain existing practice, as well as mark the course for future
growth and improvement.
The push towards professionalism poses many challenges. Deter-
mining how mediators are to be educated, trained, and perhaps certi-
fied and regulated, requires precise thinking regarding what mediators
do and should do. Further, if mediators, like most professionals, are
expected to obtain informed consent to their interventions,2 they can
do so only by providing thoughtful and accurate information about
the process.2 6 Further discussion and reflection is needed to close the
gap between mediation theory and reality. The conceptual vocabulary
suggested in this Article offers additional tools to assist in this task.
285. Medical professionals, for example, must secure informed consent to their inter-
ventions from patients or face negligence claims. See generally Canterbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Typically, this requires the physician to inform the patient of all
material information regarding her condition and the risks and benefits of suggested and
alternative treatment. See 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMSSION, supra note 210, at 15-23.
While the duty to secure informed consent is usually only imposed where a client
voluntarily seeks professional services, it may be that the duty of disclosure is more com-
pelling when the professional's services are mandated, as they often are in court-referred
mediation.
286. The Alaska Judicial Council encourages consumers to actively pursue the infor-
mation necessary to provide informed consent to mediation. The Council's Consumer
Guide to Selecting a Mediator (Guide) urges consumers to decide, in advance, what they
want from mediation, review a mediator's written qualifications, and follow up that review
with an in-person interview. At the interview, the Guide suggests that consumers question
the mediator about her background and methodology, including- what ethical standards
apply;, what confidentiality protections does she respect; what is the fee; and what is the
mediator's approach to mediation? See ALASKA JUDicIAL CouNcI. PROVIDEs INFORMA-
TION FOR CONSUMERS ON SELECING MEDIATORS, 6 WORLD ARB. AND MEDIATION REP.
(Sept. 1995). While the Council is to be commended for its effort to spur consumers to
make informed choices regarding mediation providers, that effort is necessarily dependent
on the accuracy and insightfulness of the answers mediators provide to consumer inquiries.
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